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INTRODUCTION

In Kosovo' today, two parallel judicial systems each claim absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction over the province. One system is sponsored by the
t
Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to the Center for
International Legal Education at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and the University of
Pittsburgh's Russian and East European Studies Center for funding my trips to Kosovo, and to Mark
Walter and James Stockstill for facilitating my research there. I am grateful to Judge Kaplan Baruti,
Daniel Deja, Enver Fezjullahu, Dara Katz, Francesca Marzatico, Lyubomir Pantovic, Knut Rosenhaug,
Michael Scheutz, Alice Thomas, and Adem Vokshi for discussing these issues with me in Kosovo; to
Dusan Jelic, Vegim Rugova, and Xhyli Selimi for interpreting for me; to Vjosa Osmani, Luljeta Plakolli,
and Jeremy Seeman for their research; and to Paul Berman, Ron Brand, John Burkoff, Paul Dubinsky,
Amanda Frost, Jamie Munro, John Parry, Matthias Reiman, Michael Scharf, Dinah Shelton, Linda
Tashbook, Melissa Waters, Stephanie Zai, David Zaring, and the participants in the American Society of
Comparative Law Workshop "Comparative Law in Progress," for their comments, advice, and
encouragement.
1.
Most place names in this Article are given in both Serbian and Albanian, as is the common
practice within the United Nations and other international organizations operating in Kosovo. However,
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United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), the
other by the government of Serbia ("Serbia"). The UNMIK courts are new
creations, staffed mostly by Kosovo Albanians and a few members of the
minority Serb population, but controlled primarily by the international
UNMIK administration. 2 For the United Nations, these courts are the
incarnation of its claim to have established rule of law under principles of
non-discrimination and ethnic integration. For Serbia, they are illegitimate
occupiers' courts, symbolizing the continued foreign domination of Serbian
territory.
The Serbian parallel courts 3 are courts-in-exile, transplants of the official
Kosovo courts that existed before the NATO bombing and the UNMIK
administration. To Serbia, they represent the original and legitimate courts of
Kosovo and are an expression of Serbia's continuing claim to sovereignty
over the province. To the United Nations, they are an obstacle to the
resolution of Kosovo's still uncertain political status, since its "Standards for
Kosovo" require that "parallel structures have been dismantled ' 4 when
UNMIK yields administration to a permanent government.
Kosovo's parallel courts raise a classic question of post-conflict justice:
How should a transitional government and its courts address the legacy of the
past regime? 5 "In the public imagination, transitional justice is commonly
linked with punishment and the trials of ancien regimes,', 6 yet Kosovo's
parallel courts represent the under-recognized reality that this legacy is not
just a matter of historical events, but rather, permeates the very structures of
transitional societies, including the legal system itself.7 Shaped in settings of
violence and repression, post-conflict legal systems like Kosovo's maintain
core features of these settings even after the conflict itself has formally ended.
The very existence of the dual systems in Kosovo is a product of the SerbianAlbanian conflict. In their opposing claims to sole jurisdiction and their
corresponding stance of mutual non-recognition, the parallel courts replicate,
because it would be cumbersome to refer to "Kosovo/Kosova" throughout the Article in light of the
frequency with which I use the term, I will refer solely to "Kosovo" throughout, as is also common
practice in the U.N. and other organizations. This choice is purely a pragmatic one and is not intended to
have political or other implications.
S.C. Res. 1244, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On
2.
the Appointment and Removal from Office of InternationalJudges and InternationalProsecutors, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/6 (Feb. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/exam/
testdata/doc/5948d29e 06.pdf; U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On Assignment of International
Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000),
availableat http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg64-O0.htm.
Although these sets of courts are in a structural sense parallel to each other, and could thus
3.
technically both be called "parallel courts," it is common practice in Kosovo to use this term only for the
Serbian courts. The UNMIK courts, in contrast, are never referred to as such. Accordingly, in order to be
as clear as possible about which courts I am referring to for readers within and without Kosovo, I refer
throughout this Article to the "Serbian parallel courts" on the one hand, and to the "UNMIK courts" on
the other. Like the other linguistic choices in this Article, this one is purely pragmatic and is not
intended to have any political or other implications.
4.
Press Release, U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Standards for Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
10, 2003), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/
(Dec.
UNMIK/PR/1078
pressr/pr1 078.pdf.

2002).

5.

See generally RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002).

6.
7.

Id. at 27.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE xv (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
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and thus perpetuate, the divisions and disputes of the conflict that produced
them, serving as a potential catalyst for ongoing divisions and violence.
Indeed, the legacy of parallel courts in Kosovo hampers everyday
decisions, as well as the pursuit of justice on a larger scale. For the people of
Kosovo, these parallel systems create legal uncertainty and conflict on a basic,
day-to-day level. Judgments from one system are not recognized by the other,
nor do the two systems share court files, cadastral records of title to land, or
records of births, deaths, marriages, or divorces. To ensure enforcement of a
divorce, a land sale, or a civil judgment, a Kosovo resident must pursue her
claims in both systems. This presents a confusing, costly, and complex
proposition that gives rise to conflicting judgments and to speculation and
arbitrage. Because neither system recognizes the other's judgments, criminal
suspects may face trial in both sets of courts. There are accusations of ethnic
bias in some cases concerning inter-ethnic violence and crime, and fears that
inter-ethnic disputes over land ownership are being fueled by the maintenance
of parallel and mutually exclusive sets of property records.
For all concerned, the parallel systems stand for the larger political
stalemate over Kosovo's fate. Kosovo cannot claim to be self-governing while
Serbia also purports to govern it. Nor can Serbia claim Kosovo as an integral
part of the Serbian state so long as the Serbian government is effectively cut
off from the basic institutions controlling the province. Negotiations are
currently ongoing to determine Kosovo's final status, whether that will be
autonomy, independence,
or some other form of association with Serbia or
8
another state. As it does so, the parallel courts issue is a synecdoche of the
obstacles it faces: of the intractable political conflict over sovereignty that
resists compromise, of the persistent ethnic divisions that defy integration, and
of the stubborn gaps between ideal and reality within both judicial systems.
While Kosovo's parallel systems are an extreme example of a past
regime's legacy expressed as a full-fledged alternative court system, legal
legacies of repressive norms, compromised courts, or ad hoc local tribunals
are commonplace in transitional and post-conflict societies. Nonetheless, in
recent years, the international community has focused its energies in another
direction: to securing criminal justice in post-conflict societies for atrocities of
the worst kind, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
While this is a laudable goal, it is far from the only transitional justice concern
these societies face. Compensation for injuries and deaths, disputes over
property rights, and the ad hoc and local measures that communities take to
meet these needs when the state legal system is in flux: arguably these
immediate concerns are as important to rebuilding post-conflict societies as
high level criminal prosecutions of former political leaders. But while
criminal prosecutions have received the untiring efforts of some political
institutions and non-governmental organizations, the international community
8.

Press Release, U.N. Office of the Special Envoy to Kosovo [UNOSEK], Pristina,

Belgrade Delegations Meet in Vienna to Discuss the Future Status Processfor Kosovo, U.N. Doc.

UNOSEK/PR/2
(Feb.
21,
2006),
available
at
http://www.unosek.org/pressrelease/
UNOSEKPR%202_2006-02-21 .pdf, News Coverage, UNMIK, Kosovo: UN Envoy Puts off Presenting
Final Status Proposal till After Serb Poll in January (Nov. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#1 011.
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has not yet fully engaged itself
in exploring ways of addressing these other
9
transitional justice concerns.
Beyond the transitional justice context, Kosovo's parallel courts are also
an example of the legal pluralism that has developed in other divided
societies. Such a comprehensive parallel court system seems to be unique to
Kosovo, but in many other states, communities have established their own
judicial systems, claiming their own jurisdiction and following their own
rules. The underlying social and political tensions associated with plural
systems and the legal questions concerning recognition and enforcement of
judgments are common to these systems as well. How, for example, should
Mexico treat decisions from Zapatista courts? What about the judgments of
religious authorities in Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, or France? How can long
divided societies like the Greek and Turkish administrations in Cyprus
incorporate each other's judicial determinations if they are eventually unified?
In analyzing the issues raised by the parallel courts in Kosovo, we may
develop principles that are relevant for other states.
These problems are not purely political, but also legal. The fundamental
underlying tension in Kosovo, as in other conflicted societies, is politicalhere, competing claims to sovereignty over the province. Whether the Serbian
parallel legal system should continue to exist is likewise a political decision
that will be resolved eventually in the political realm, whether by negotiation
and compromise or by force. But the Serbian parallel system has issued legal
decisions for seven years already and continues to do so. As long as people in
Kosovo continue to rely on those decisions, past or present, whether those
judgments can and should be recognized and enforced are legal questions that
must be addressed.
These questions should be addressed separately from the ultimate
political question of sovereignty as much as possible, on a purely legal level.
Although there is a tendency to treat post-conflict and transitional legal
settings as unique,1° in this situation, the ordinary systems for recognizing and
enforcing foreign judgments and extra-judicial legal determinations offer
seasoned approaches for grappling with the questions of legitimacy and
fairness presented here. These systems were developed, after all, precisely in
order to deal with contentious inter-state disputes in cases of overlapping
claims to jurisdiction." Whether the Serbian parallel court judgments could
be legally recognized, therefore, is a question that can be analyzed through
comparative and conflict of laws approaches, looking to established
procedures for recognition and enforcement of judgments. Here, although it
may appear that there can be no mutual recognition while both systems claim
exclusive jurisdiction over Kosovo, in fact, there are multiple models for
recognition between overlapping systems. Some of these models would not
9.
Bassiouni, supra note 7, at xv-xx (concluding, however, that it is appropriate to prioritize
criminal justice); Anja Matwijkiw, A PhilosophicalPerspective on Rights, Accountability and PostConflict Justice: Setting up the Problem, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 155. See generally
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).

10. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary
Justice, 117 HARv. L. REV. 761 (2004).
11.
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5-9 (1988).
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require the courts to recognize each other's legitimacy as judicial institutions
per se, nor to recognize the relevant political2 entities' claims to exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory.'
This is not to suggest, of course, that the political and legal realms
operate entirely separately from each other. To the contrary, it is my
contention that the existence of political interests in the results of legal
processes is an entirely ordinary thing, particularly in the field of recognition
of judgments. Rather than posing a counter-argument against the use of legal
processes to address the question of the parallel court judgments, the existence
of political tensions presents exactly the sort of situation for which these legal
processes were developed and designed. As such, these processes regularly
tolerate the stress introduced by such political pressures. The sense, rather, in
which the political and legal are separate and should be treated separately is
that the determination of the legal status of these decisions need not
predetermine the ultimate political judgment on Kosovo's sovereignty, nor
does this ultimate political judgment need to take place in order for the status
of the parallel judgments to be laid to rest. Likewise, should a decision on
Kosovo's sovereignty be reached before the parallel judgments have been
addressed, that decision need not predetermine the recognition of those
judgments either. While the political and the legal are always in some sense
interrelated, the particular legal question of the status of parallel court
judgments can be determined independently of the particular political question
of Kosovo's sovereignty.
In considering whether and how to recognize the Serbian parallel courts'
judgments, Kosovo faces a tension between two competing goals: promoting
certainty in the finality and consistency of those judgments and ensuring their
essential fairness. To best promote legal certainty, Kosovo should establish
mechanisms that maximize recognition of judgments, thereby eliminating the
risks of conflicting judgments and of unenforced decisions. However, if the
Serbian parallel courts employ discriminatory procedures or issue arbitrary
judgments, broader recognition of those judgments will merely lend them
undeserved legitimacy. There is, accordingly, a countervailing incentive to
scrutinize Serbian parallel judgments before recognizing them, or not to
recognize them at all.
A balance between these two values-certainty and fairness-lies at the
core of existing international and national legal frameworks for recognition
and enforcement of judgments. The trade-off between the two values is by no
means absolute, but in general, establishing measures to protect one of these
goals does tend to result in some cost to the other. Subjecting judgments to
increased levels of scrutiny to ensure their fairness inevitably introduces
delays and unpredictability in their enforcement, in rough proportion to the
complexity of the procedures and the stringency of the tests employed for that
purpose. The proper balance between these competing goals depends on an
assessment of the likelihood that one or the other concern will arise, and of the
impact that it is likely to have, both on individual litigants and on the society
and judicial system as a whole.
12.

See discussion infra Part Ill.
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In determining whether to adopt one of these models, Kosovo's postconflict, transitional status provides the context in which those models must
be weighed. Likewise, the aims of transitional justice provide a normative
imperative for applying the available models creatively and purposefully.
While the content of transitional justice norms such as "rule of law" is hotly
debated, as are the appropriate mechanisms for achieving such norms, there is
no doubt that the aim of transitional justice is at heart transformative, seeking
to "advance legitimacy in periods of political flux."'1 3 There is also by now
general agreement that, particularly in post-conflict contexts, achieving any
degree of this transformation through law requires accepting that this justice
will inevitably be "imperfect and partial," guided by "pragmatic principles.' 4
Indeed, Ruti Teitel has argued that the aims of transitional justice have
evolved from "the ambitious goals of establishing rule of law and democracy"
to the "concededly more modest" ones of "maintaining peace and stability."
In Kosovo, the current approach of formal non-recognition, moderated
by sporadic, unpredictable acknowledgment of judgments in particular cases
for reasons of equity or compassion, creates legal uncertainties that inflict real
harm upon the people of Kosovo and exacerbate the underlying political and
social tensions. Resolving the issue of recognition of judgments on purely
legal, apolitical terms by following well established and generally recognized
models would, in contrast, provide an immediate solution to the people who
are relying on Serbian parallel judgments in their private lives. If
accomplished before the negotiations on Kosovo's political status are
completed, it would also provide a foundation for political compromise on the
broader questions of sovereignty. In this context, even if a legal solution were
to achieve nothing more than to take the issue of the parallel courts off the
political bargaining table and out of the realm of social conflict, that would
itself be a productive end.
This Article undertakes an assessment of Kosovo's parallel courts and of
the existing legal models for recognition and enforcement of judgments, with
the aim of proposing an appropriate
16 framework for recognizing the judgments
of the Serbian parallel courts. Part II describes the workings of the parallel
13.
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 893, 897
(2003). Cf Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "'Ruleof Law,"
101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2322-23 (2003).
14.
Teitel, supra note 13, at 897.
15.
Id. at 898; see also Neil J. Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for PostConflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 55.
16.
Throughout this Article, I address the problem from the perspective of solutions UNMIK
or a subsequent independent or autonomous Kosovo administration might adopt in order to provide at
least some recognition ofjudgments. Although the problem of conflicting judgments affects Serbia and
other states as well as Kosovo, it is relevant to those states only on a completely different scale and in a
completely different context. For Kosovo, this is a core problem of transitional justice and the
legitimacy of its judicial system. It is primarily within Kosovo that these judgments have their effect and
it is UNMIK and the eventual post-U.N. Kosovo institutions that will have to determine how to

reconcile these judgments. For Serbia and other states, in contrast, transitional justice norms are less
relevant. For these other states, the parallel court judgments are but one of the sets ofjudgments that the
courts must choose whether to recognize and enforce. Nonetheless, at a general level my analysis may
also be relevant for Serbian institutions determining how to treat INMIK judgments, if modified to take
account of the relevant Serbian law and Serbian interests in Kosovo.
Also, this Article focuses solely on the parallel courts themselves and on the recognition of their
judgments. All parallel administrative structures of other kinds, including security forces, education, and
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systems, based in part on my own first-hand research in Kosovo, including
interviews with Albanian and Serb judges and lawyers and with members of
the international community working on the relevant legal issues.1 7 In Part III,
I consider prominent legal models for recognizing decisions in civil disputes
that have been reached outside of the state's court system, and in Part IV, I
review the more difficult concerns posed by criminal judgments and the more
limited models available to address them.
In my assessment, the proper balance between promoting legal certainty
and ensuring fairness in Kosovo weighs more strongly in favor of promoting
legal certainty in the civil context. In the criminal context, ensuring the
fairness of the Serbian parallel judgments should be the preeminent concern.
In addition, on the civil side, a robust set of models provide for generous
recognition of civil judgments and present determinative factors that would
allow Kosovo to mitigate the political and social costs associated with such
recognition. In contrast, in the criminal realm, the models are few, the
approaches to recognition relatively stingy, and the political and social
problems associated with recognition in Kosovo are intractable and difficult to
circumvent. Accordingly, I propose a civil judgments model that would allow
for categorical recognition of most Serbian parallel civil decisions, while in
the criminal context I reluctantly conclude that categorical recognition is not
feasible and that the criminal judgments must instead be assessed on a caseby-case basis.
health care, are outside the scope of this article. The only areas of administration that I address are those
that represent the recording and enforcement of court judgments, such as the cadastral records that
reflect court judgments recognizing sale of property and the personal records that set down family law
decrees on matters such as divorces and child custody. For a discussion of the full range of parallel
structures, see DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR.
MISSION IN Kosovo, PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN Kosovo
STRUCTURES REPORT].

(2003)

[hereinafter

OSCE PARALLEL

17.
A brief note on methodology: In addition to the legal and document-based research for
this article, I conducted interviews with eleven people during a visit to Kosovo in May 2005, some of
which serve as the basis for the description of the parallel courts' current activities in Section lID. I
have identified most interviewees here by name, title, and workplace. However, all interviewees spoke
in their personal capacities and not as representatives of their respective institutions. Some interviews
were conducted directly in English, while others were conducted in Serbian or Albanian through
translators. I selected my interviewees primarily on the basis of their experience with the UNMIK and
Serbian parallel courts and with the related legal issues. They represent a number of different
communities and legal institutions, including the relevant ethnic communities, lawyers, judges, and
members of the international institutions operating in Kosovo. The number and selection of interviewees
were limited in part by the unwillingness of many to speak about this topic because of its political
sensitivity, while others would agree to discuss the matter only on an anonymous basis. Accordingly,
these interviews are not intended to serve as a representative sample of the legal community in Kosovo,
but rather are simply the reporting of knowledgeable individuals on their experience and observations.
The interviewees do not endorse and are not responsible for the analysis or conclusions in this article;
these are mine alone. Insofar as possible, I have cited multiple sources for the information obtained
through these interviews and have cited anonymous sources only when the information was not
available from another source.
It is important to note that although such interviews are the subjective accounts of individual
members of Kosovo's legal community, this is nonetheless the most up-to-date information available
about the Serbian parallel system. All the official reports on the subject are several years old and,
significantly, rely on similar interviews for their information. Nonetheless, wherever possible I have
confirmed the reports of my interviewees with references to the official reports. Throughout, citations to
reports represent a historical record of the situation as of 2003 or earlier, while citations to interviews
represent the views of some members of Kosovo's legal community in 2005.
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From this analysis, there emerge some factors to be considered in
developing models for recognition of judgments from outside the state-run
court system, such as correspondence to existing legal models, convergences
and divergences between the systems, and other concerns. The concluding
section of the Article discusses these principles for other divided and
transitioning states facing a problem of parallel courts.
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United Nations Cartographic Section, Peacekeeping Map: UNMIK (Kosovo) (2004),
18.
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kosovo.pdf. Kosovo comprises an area of less than
11,000 square kilometers, approximately one-third the size of Belgium. It has roughly two million
residents, majority Albanian, with minority Serb, Roma, Turks, and other ethnicities. Most people live in
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A.

THE PARALLEL COURTS

PoliticalHistory

The current situation in Kosovo had its birth in the province's
cataclysmic violence in 1998 and 1999, its gestation in the decade of
discriminatory government that preceded it, and its inception some time long
ago, preserved and obscured in contradictory historicized mythologies.' 9 The
story of the courts in Kosovo is both representative of and shaped by the
history of the region's political system as a whole.
Kosovo, together with the rest of the Balkans, has had the misfortune of
being a contested territory on the border of competing empires for centuries.
All this time, it has served as a strategic prize to be quarreled over, snatched,
relinquished, and regained by powers its own peoples could not hope to
control. Of importance for the current conflict, Kosovo was the site of a
crucial defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans in 1389, initiating 500 years of
Ottoman rule and crystallizing Kosovo's place as hallowed ground in Serbian
nationalist ideology. 20 The modem struggle for Kosovo began in 1912, when
after some years of Albanian revolt against waning Ottoman control, the
Serbian army conquered Kosovo. During World War I it was occupied by the
Austrians, and in 1918, when the victorious powers divided the majority
Albanian region of the Balkans between the new states of Yugoslavia and
Albania, Kosovo went to Yugoslavia. Armed and political struggles over
whether the province should be part of the new federation, part of Albania, or
independent, ensued for a number of years. 22
During the Cold War, under Tito's rule, Kosovo's political fate shifted.
It gradually acquired increasing powers of self-government within
Yugoslavia, with the most significant step being its acquisition of the status of
an autonomous province and self-government under the 1974 Yugoslav
constitution. Within the Yugoslavian legal system, Kosovo's system
overlapped with the federal one, sharing, for example, its criminal procedure
code but operating under its own civil and criminal codes. Some Kosovo
Albanians began seeking status as a republic in the 1980s, which would have
rural areas. The majority Albanian population occupies most of Kosovo, while the minority Serb
population inhabits the northern portion of the province ranging from north of the lbar river that runs
through Mitrovic/Mitrovica up to the border with Serbia, as well as a number of discrete enclave
communities in other parts of the state. Although UNMIK documents typically provide place names
both in Serbian and in Albanian, this U.N. map provides place names only in Serbian. Also, note that
this map pre-dates Montenegro's independence.
19. This succinct description of Kosovo's history is not intended to be comprehensive nor to
take any position on Serbian or Albanian historical, political, or cultural claims to Kosovo. Rather, it is
meant only to present some necessary background for the legal analysis that follows. Of necessity in
such a brief account, this discussion does not touch on many aspects of Kosovo's history, ancient and
modem. For fuller histories of Kosovo and of the genesis of the current situation, see generally MISHA
GLENNY, THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-1999 (1999); ROBERT D.
KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (2005 ed.); NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOvO: A
SHORT HISTORY (1999); and TIM JUDAH, KoSovo: WAR AND REVENGE (2000).
20.
KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 35-39; MALCOLM, supra note 19, at 62-63.
21.
GLENNY, supra note 19, at 416; KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 44-45; MALCOLM, supra note

19, at 264-65.
22.

19, at 272-78.

GLENNY, supra note 19, at 416; KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 44-45; MALCOLM, supra note
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meant formally "detaching it from Serbia and conceding that it had the right to
secede. 23 Throughout this period, Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers, and
rumors of Albanian violence against Serbs were rife. 24
Kosovo's position, and the position of its inhabitants, changed
dramatically after Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power on a groundswell of
Serbian nationalism between 1987 and 1989. After Milosevic gained power,
he swiftly moved to revoke Kosovo's autonomous status. 25 Although the
numbers of Albanians and Serbs did not change, what had been the Albanian
majority in Kosovo became an Albanian minority in Serbia at large. Serbia
then instituted what has been described as an "apartheid" regime limiting
Albanian status and participation in public life.2 6 It banned the use of the
Albanian language in courts, schools and other areas of public life and fired
most Albanians from their positions in the government, including the judicial
system. In response, many Albanians boycotted what remained of the place
for example, by
allowed them in the formal government and in society,
27
educating their children in makeshift private schools.
In addition, the Albanians were the first to establish a parallel
government in Kosovo. Kosovo nationalists declared independence in 1990,
following the revocation of Kosovo's autonomous status, and throughout
this period, many Albanians refused to participate in Serbian elections, instead
electing their own
shadow parliament. However, this system did not include
29
parallel courts.
As Yugoslavia imploded, Kosovo remained outside the fray until 1996,
when the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") launched its first armed attack.
The violence between Serbian police and the KLA escalated, culminating in
the NATO bombing campaign and the Serbian offensive of 1999. After
NATO began bombing Serbian forces in the region in an effort to force their
pushing
retreat from Kosovo, those forces instead swept through the province,
30
the Albanian population into Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.
B.

Source of the ParallelCourts

When NATO air strikes eventually forced the Serbian military across the
border into Serbia proper, much of the Serb population went with it. This was
the population that had governed the province for the previous ten years, and
as they left, they took with them the symbols, tools, and institutions of
23.
24.

GLENNY, supra note 19, at 624.
See id. at 624-25.

25.

Id. at 653.

26.
Ian Fisher, Combative Milosevic Displays a Flairfor Courtroom Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2002, at A4.
27.
GLENNY, supra note 19, at 653; JUDAH, supra note 19, at 61-73.
28.
GLENNY, supra note 19, at 653.

29.

Interview with Adem Vokshi, Chairman of the Kosova Chamber of Advocates, in

Mitrovice/Mitrovica (May 27, 2005) [hereinafter Vokshi Interview] (speaking in his personal capacity).
Like the others interviewed for this article, Mr. Vokshi's contribution of factual information does not

imply any endorsement of the author's analysis or conclusions. For a brief note on the methodology of
these interviews, see supra note 17. See also JUDAH, supra note 19, at 70-73 (describing parallel
government, education, and health systems but not courts).
30.
GLENNY, supra note 19, at 654-58.
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governance, stripping the university and other public buildings bare. From the
courts, this meant not only the official court seals and stamps, but also many
of the judges, attorneys, and other personnel. Indeed, it was not just the courts
themselves that were removed, but the whole administrative structure,
including the property cadastral records and also the records of births,
marriages, divorces, and deaths. There were already copies of these records in
Belgrade, but the departing Serbs also took some of the original records from
Kosovo, so that in some instances there is now a copy in Belgrade and an
original with the Serbian parallel court or administrative office, while the
UNMIK courts do not have a copy at all.
Of course, in some instances records
31
were lost or destroyed in the mayhem.
In effect, the courts of Kosovo picked up and moved wholesale to
Serbia. There, the Serbian government reinstituted them, reasserting its
jurisdiction over its prior territories. The municipal and district courts of the
Kosovo city of Prigtina/Prishtind 32 were moved to the city of Nis in Serbia
proper, those of Mitrovicd/Mitrovica to the Serbian city of Kraljevo, and so
on. Accordingly, when the U.N. began its administration of Kosovo in 1999,
the province lacked an internally operating judicial system. Eventually, as the
Serb enclaves were established within Kosovo, some of the Serbian parallel
municipal courts and the associated cadastres set themselves up there, but the
district courts remained in Serbia proper, safely across the border from
UNMIK jurisdiction and NATO's Kosovo Force ("KFOR") troops.33
Thus, what are now the Serbian parallel courts were in fact the formal
courts of Kosovo, before the Security Council established the UNMIK civil
administration in Kosovo through Resolution 1244. Accordingly, the Serbian
parallel and UNMIK courts' competing claims to legitimacy are ultimately
grounded in the conflicting political claims to sovereignty over the province.
The Serbs did not create a new judicial system, but rather, reconstructed their
prior one and did not concede that they had lost jurisdiction, defrocked by the
combined force of NATO's military might and the UN's political power. For
its part, the U.N. has created for Kosovo both new courts and new laws,
backed by the moral authority of responding
to humanitarian need and by an
34
uncertain relationship to international law.
31.
Interview with Kaplan Baruti, President of the District Court of Mitrovice/Mitrovica and
President of the Association of Judges, in Mitrovice/Mitrovica (May 24, 2005) (speaking solely in his
personal capacity and not as a representative of the Court or the Association) [hereinafter Baruti
Interview]; Interview with Knut Rosandhaug, Executive Director, Housing and Property Directorate,
Housing and Property Claims Commission, in Prigtina/Prishtind (May 27, 2005) (speaking solely in his
personal capacity and not as a representative of the Directorate) [hereinafter Rosandhaug Interview];
Interview with Lyubomir Pantovic, defense attorney, in Mitrovica/Mitrovica (May 27, 2005) (speaking
solely in his personal capacity) [hereinafter Pantovic Interview].
32. For an explanation of my treatment of place names throughout this Article, please see
supra note 1.
33.

OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supranote 16, at 17-19.

34. NATO's justification for its use of force in Kosovo was humanitarian intervention, which
has not traditionally been considered an adequate justification for the use of force under international
law. This incident, along with cases of non-intervention such as Rwanda's genocide, has since become
the catalyst for arguments in favor of recognizing an exception authorizing use of force for humanitarian
purposes. E.g., Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe

& Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003). The U.N.'s governance of Kosovo is also on uncertain legal ground,
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Development of the ParallelSystems

Of course, the Serbian parallel courts have not continued to operate just
as they did before 1999. They do claim the same competencies and
jurisdiction, apply Serbian law, approve documents with the same stamps and
insignia, and use the same names and titles. But they have changed in
response to the transformation in their political status and in the socio-political
reality that surrounds them.
In the early months of UNMIK's administration, the Serbian parallel
courts were the only courts operating on behalf of Kosovo, whether located
within the province itself or in Serbia proper. Even as UNMIK began to
promulgate laws for Kosovo, the Serbian parallel courts continued to apply
the law of Serbia, pronouncing judgment under the ostensible authority of the
Serbian government. At this time, the Serbian parallel courts carried out the
full range of competencies that they had before UNMIK: criminal and civil
cases, including on the civil side all manner of litigation, family matters such
as marriages and divorces, and affirmation of contracts including,
significantly, contracts for the sale of real property. Although Albanians and
Serbs had separated themselves into two societies, both Albanians and Serbs
had only the Serbian parallel structures to turn to in order to resolve their legal
problems.35
For the last seven years, the Serbian parallel courts and the other Serbian
parallel administrative offices serving judicial, adjudicative, and recordkeeping functions have continued to operate. The Serbian parallel judicial
system is divided between one set of courts ensconced within the Serb
enclaves in Kosovo itself, and another set operating within Serbia on behalf of
their assigned regions in Kosovo. Only municipal courts (the lowest level,
first instance courts) operate within the enclaves in Kosovo itself, and it is said
that some of these courts act as a referral service for the courts in Serbia as

although it does not directly contravene established international law as NATO's campaign did. Kosovo
was the first instance in which the Security Council relied on Chapter VII as a basis for establishing
U.N. administration over a territory. In the political and legal vacuum caused by Serbia's withdrawal
from the province, some form of transitional administration was likely both necessary and directly
related to the Security Council's Chapter VII authority to address threats to international peace and
security. There is, however, a reasonable argument that the extent and duration of the civil
administration in Kosovo extends beyond the scope of that authority. Michael J. Matheson, United
Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 76-78, 83-85 (2001) (arguing that
this type of administration is within the Security Council's authority but acknowledging that it is not a
settled question and considering the counter-arguments).
35.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. Of Kosovo's other, smaller
minorities, most tend to live either in their own discrete communities or in the Serbian enclaves,
although the Turk minority is reportedly well-integrated into Kosovo Albanian society. These minorities
do not exert much political influence and do not operate under their own legal system, instead making
use of both the Serbian parallel and UNMIK systems. ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., TENTH
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN Kosovo 31-33 (2003) [hereinafter OSCE

TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT]; Interview with Alice Thomas and Francesca Marzatico, International
Legal Advisors, Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo in PrigtinaIPrishtind (May 25, 2005) (speaking
solely in their personal capacities and not as representatives of the Ombudsperson) [hereinafter Thomas
& Marzatico Interview].
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much as proper courts in their own right. In Serbia proper, both municipal
courts and district courts (the second tier court) hear cases and appeals.36
Meanwhile, the province of Kosovo has been administered for the last
seven years by UNMIK as a protectorate under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1244. 37 From the complete shambles of 1999, Kosovo's judicial
system has been recreated, reorganized, and restaffed, mostly with Kosovo
Albanians, but also with some Serbs, and, strategically, with international
judges and prosecutors in the Supreme Court and in other key positions. There
are now UNMIK courts established for every district of Kosovo. 38 UNMIK
has been facilitating the development of Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment, with the intention of eventually turning over all governance in
Kosovo to these institutions, including the judiciary. In 2006, Kosovo began
international negotiations over its final status, and since then, UNMIK has
turned over control of certain institutions, such as the Ombudsman's office, to
local authorities. 39 While a December 2005 UNMIK regulation established a
Ministry of Justice as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,
at this time, that Ministry was still "preparing to gradually take over the
majority of the justice-related reserved powers ' 40 held by UNMIK, and
UNMIK still issues regulations, controls appointment of judges, and
administers the courts directly in most respects. 4
The relationship between the UNMIK courts and the Serbian courts has
been one of a shifting balance of power. Initially, UNMIK courts were
unknown to the population, and the Serbian parallel courts represented the
familiar, established judiciary. At times, the Serbian parallel courts and
UNMIK courts within Kosovo have operated side by side, causing no
inconsiderable confusion for parties who arrived at the courthouse to find
themselves confronted by two sets of courts. In the Serb enclave of Zubin
Potok, for example, the Serbian parallel court for some time had its office on
the same floor of the same building as the UNMIK court and was marked by a
sign reading simply: "Certification of Contracts, Authorisations; Tuesday and
42
Friday 9-11 AM; Municipal Court of Mitrovica Sub-Office Zubin Potok.
Over time, as UNMIK courts have been established within many of the
enclaves, the actual activities of the Serbian parallel courts located within
36.
Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview,
supra note 29; Interview with Daniel Deja, Chief of Party, and Enver Fejzullahu, Senior Staff Associate,
Justice System Reform Activity in Kosovo, in Prigtina/Prishtine (May 25, 2005) (speaking in their
personal capacities) [hereinafter Deja & Fejzullahu Interview]; U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES &
ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., NINTH ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

IN Kosovo, para. 30 (May 31,

2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/

MinorityAssessmentReport9ENG.pdf [hereinafter OSCE NINTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT].

37.

S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 2.

38.
39.

EUR. PARL. ASS., Res. 1417, art. 5(ii) (2005).
OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KoSovo, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at 4 (July
11, 2006) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT].
40.
Id. at 19.

41.
Id. at 18-19; U.N. Mission in Kosovo Home Page, http://www.unmik.org (last visited Dec.
2, 2006). The respective roles and authorities of UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment concerning the judiciary are not well-defined. See, e.g., U.N. Mission in Kosovo,
ConstitutionalFramework for Provisional Self-Government, art. 9.4, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9
(May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework].
42. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-18.
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those areas have diminished correspondingly.4 3 However, the UNMIK courts
are still inactive within some enclaves, leaving the Serbian parallel courts to
fill the void. Throughout Kosovo and in Serbia proper, the Serbian parallel
courts continue to operate today. 44
D.

The ParallelSystems' CurrentRole

The Serbian parallel courts no longer play the all-encompassing role
that they did in the first days and months of UNMIK's administration. Over
the past seven years, the UNMIK courts have taken over many of the ordinary
legal functions of the province. Nevertheless, the Serbian parallel system
continues to fill crucial gaps in the functioning of the UNMIK administration,
especially for the Serb minority, but for the rest of the population as well.
Insofar as the recognition of Serbian parallel court judgments is
concerned, what is most important is that their judgments from the past seven
years represent a legal edifice of contracts, marriages, criminal convictions,
and other decisions that Kosovo cannot readily discard. The most recent report
on the Serbian parallel system indicates that it heard roughly 8000 cases and
claims between June 1999 (at the end of the NATO bombing) and January
2003, and that it had approximately 780 cases pending as of January 2003, of
which 700 had been filed during the UNMIK administration. These cases ran
the gamut of subjects, including both civil and criminal matters.45
Both Kosovo and Serbia have civil law, code-based systems.
Accordingly, the existence of parallel legal systems does not present a
problem of conflicting lines of precedent, as it would in a common law
system, because the results in each case are binding only on the parties.
Indeed, in each case the judge applies the relevant provisions of the applicable
legal code directly to the case in question, without consideration of prior case
law. Of course, these are not the same codes: The Serbian parallel courts
apply the law of Serbia, while the UNMIK courts apply a combination of old
and new laws, with some pre-dating the dissolution of Yugoslavia and others
implemented after the beginning of UNMIK administration.
1.

In Civil Cases

In civil matters, the Serb community currently uses the Serbian parallel
structures far more than the Albanian population, which tends to rely on the
UNMIK system as much as possible. However, all Kosovo residents,
43.
For example, the internal Serbian parallel courts no longer operate in the formal court
buildings, but are relegated to private offices and, it is said, even in some instances to private homes.
Pantovic Interview, supra note 31.
44.
OSCE TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 34, at 33; Vokshi Interview, supra note
29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36.
As of May 2002, Serbian parallel courts were still hearing cases for the entire territory of
45.
Kosovo, with thirty-four judges working in a variety of municipal courts within the enclaves in Kosovo
and some number of municipal and district courts operating within Serbia proper. OSCE PARALLEL
STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-21. In May 2005, those I interviewed opined that, from what
they had observed, the Serbian parallel courts within Kosovo had a reduced caseload and a narrower
range of competencies than in the past. Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Pantovic Interview, supra note
31; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36.
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regardless of ethnicity, have to use the Serbian parallel system for certain
crucial matters in which UNMIK has not attained competency or received
international recognition. Furthermore, the UNMIK system suffers from a
confusing patchwork of new and old laws and from the absence of pre-1999
records, hampering its effectiveness and inducing Albanians as well as Serbs
to turn to the Serbian parallel system for some concerns.
Many Serbs have continued to use the Serbian parallel system for
matters that are internal to the Serb communit%, such as contracts, marriages,
and litigation in which both parties are Serb. However, this reliance is not
necessarily a political statement. Many Serbs do not feel comfortable traveling
outside their enclaves because of security concerns, and while there are
UNMIK courts for every district in the province, UNMIK has established
courts in only some of the enclaves within those districts.47 It has proven
difficult for UNMIK to attract Serb prosecutors and judges, due both to
security problems and to social pressure, and this has both slowed the process
of establishing courts in Serb-dominated areas and contributed to the problem
of Serbian mistrust of Albanian-dominated institutions. 48 There are also
simple but substantial pragmatic and convenience costs associated with going
to the often unfamiliar and distant UNMIK courts. 4 9 In areas where the
UNMIK courts have come to be viewed as effective, they have reportedly
received increasing numbers of Serbian cases. 50 However, while the problems
of violence, social pressure, and mistrust of the UNMIK courts' fairness and
effectiveness were most
acute in the early years of UNMIK administration,
51

they continue today.
In contrast, the Albanian population, generally averse to the indicia and
institutions of the prior regime, has shifted its civil claims gradually to the
UNMIK courts, to the extent that the courts have proved themselves capable
of handling claims and cases. In addition, just as Serbs are reluctant to travel
into Albanian dominated areas, so many Albanians hesitate to travel into the
Serb enclaves, for similar reasons of security and inconvenience. As a result

46.
Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 3 1. Eighty percent of
Serbs surveyed in 2005 indicated that they followed Serbian law rather than Kosovo law. INT'L FED'N
FOR ELECTION Sys. & U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., MEASURING AND IMPROVING CITIZENS'
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY IN Kosovo 2005, at 21 (2005),

available at http://www.ifes.org/publication/847lb8e4a755a9e35938d86f563a8le8/kosovo-survey.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY].
47.
OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN Kosovo, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, at 12, 1819 (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT].

48.
For example, in 1999, UNMIK hired two Serb judges and two Serb prosecutors to work at
the court in North Mitrovica, a Serbian area, along with four Albanian judges and some Albanian
prosecutors. Within a month, all the Serbs had quit, reportedly due to pressure and threats from members
of the Serbian community not to cooperate with UNMIK. Since then, UNMIK has succeeded in hiring
two Serb judges for the Mitrovica court. Baruti Interview, supra note 3 1.
49.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 22; Baruti Interview, supra note
31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi
Interview, supra note 29.

50.
Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 3 1; Vokshi Interview,
supra note 29.
51.
For example, in a 2005 public opinion survey, only 18% of Serbs surveyed indicated
confidence in the UNMIK courts. Seventy-nine percent of Serbs surveyed expressed the view that there
was bias and inequality in the system. 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 14.
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of these disincentives, most Albanians use the Serbian parallel courts
only for
52
those matters which the UNMIK courts are not competent to handle.
There are still several crippling limitations to the effectiveness of the
UNMIK courts that push Kosovo residents of all ethnicities to make use
instead of the Serbian parallel courts and administrative structures. On the one
hand, presently the UNMIK courts and administration are functioning within
Kosovo itself, so that Kosovo residents of whatever ethnicity can accomplish
virtually any legal or bureaucratic task for purposes of enforcement within
Kosovo through those courts, whether it be seeking a civil judgment, pursuing
a divorce, participating in53 a criminal trial, or getting an UNMIK travel
document or license plates.
However, these judgments and documents are not necessarily effective
outside Kosovo. They are not recognized by Serbia, nor by a number of other
neighboring states. In order to enforce a civil judgment against a Serb
defendant; in order to travel on a Serbian passport that is good for ten years
and recognized by all states, instead of an UNMIK travel document that is
good for two years and recognized by only some states; in order to drive one's
car legally in some neighboring states; in order to have one's divorce,
property sale, or inheritance recognized in Serbia; and in order to have one's
criminal conviction or acquittal recognized as final in Serbia, Kosovo
residents, whether Albanian
or Serb, must pursue their interests through the
54
system.
parallel
Serbian
But of course, UNMIK does not recognize Serbian parallel court and
administration judgments either, so to have one's judgment, license plate,
divorce, and so on recognized by the UNMIK administration that currently
controls Kosovo (and by the KFOR and police forces that enforce the law
there), all residents of Kosovo, whether Albanian or Serbian, must pursue
their interests through the UNMIK system.55 Accordingly, the only way to
have one's legal document or judgment recognized everywhere is to pursue it
through both systems independently.
Another limitation on UJNMIK effectiveness is that UNMIK does not
have many of the pre-1999 Kosovo records. Some were taken to Serbia, some
were destroyed, and some are still in the possession of the Serbian parallel
52.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 18-19; Baruti Interview, supra
note 3 1; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. In contrast to
Serbian views, see supra note 46, 98% of Albanians report following Kosovo law. 2005 PUBLIC OPINION
SURVEY, supra note 46, at 21. In addition, the majority of Albanians indicate "at least a fair amount of
confidence in the legal system's [i.e. the UNMIK courts'] ability to maintain law and order and protect
rights," and only I1% of Albanians indicated any level of disagreement with the statement that "the
judicial system in Kosovo is unbiased and treats all persons equally." Id., at 14, 21.
53.
Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.
54.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 6; Thomas & Marzatico
Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.
55.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5; OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 53-54; OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at
I I; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. Note that nonrecognition is not identical with non-toleration. While UNMIK has not recognized parallel courts or
other parallel structures as legitimate, it has tolerated their existence and activities at varying levels at
varying times, in the sense of not acting to eliminate them or prevent their activity. Cf DANIEL SERWER
& YLL BAJRAKTARI, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, Kosovo: ETHNIC NATIONALISM AT ITS
TERRITORIAL WORST (2006), available at https://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr 172.pdf.
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courts in the enclaves. Regardless, if a matter requires confirmation of a legal
document from before 1999, such as the criminal record statement required to
obtain a visa, one must go through the Serbian parallel system to acquire that
document. 56 The UNMIK courts can request documents from Serbia by an
indirect route through the UNMIK administration, but this process is far more
cumbersome than direct resort to the Serbian
parallel system, and Serbia has
57
ignored UNMIK requests in some cases.
Furthermore, under UNMIK's rule, the law in force in Kosovo now is a
hodgepodge of different sources: regulations issued by the Special
Representative to the Secretary General (the "SRSG") trump, followed by the
pre-1989 law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the extent that
it is not discriminatory, codes drafted and approved by the provisional
legislature and the SRSG, and international law. 8 This mdlange of sources of
law, together with UNMIK's failure to adequately distribute and translate its
new regulations, have
created substantial uncertainty as to what the law is on
59
any given subject.
Finally, the UNMIK courts have suffered from the understandable
problems of a new court system: a backlog of cases, lack of staffing on every
level, an inexperienced judiciary and bar in need of training, lack of
compliance with judgments, and so on. This has resulted in lengthy delays in
proceedings, accusations of partiality, and an inability to execute judgments.
There are also charges of widespread corruption, resulting at least in part from
inadequate salaries. Although the UNMIK system is fully effective in
principle, in practice there remain vital lags in its operation,
and the Serbian
60
parallel courts are in many instances operating as a stopgap.
Generalizing broadly, the net result is that Albanians tend to use the
UNMIK system for most civil matters, except when they need recognition
from Serbia or another UNMIK-unfriendly government, or when the UNMIK
system flounders, and then they turn to the Serbian parallel system. Serbs by
and large use the UNMIK system for anything involving interaction with
UNMIK or the broader Albanian community, but frequently use the Serbian

56.
This reality has given rise to a new cottage industry. Because some Albanians are not
comfortable traveling to Serbia or to the enclaves to visit the Serbian parallel courts/administration,
there are Serbs who, for a fee, will travel to the requisite court or office to acquire or file the necessary
document. Pantovic Interview, supra note 3 1; see also OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra
note 16, at 22.
57.
OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 53-54; OSCE PARALLEL
STRUCTURES REPORT, supranote 16, at 21; Baruti Interview, supra note 3 1.
58.
U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000).
59.
In a 2005 public opinion survey, 77% of Kosovo residents surveyed said they "did not
know how to obtain information about the law" in Kosovo, and 80% "did not know that UNMIK
publicly announces any new regulations." 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 9-10. See
also OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 12-14. For an assessment of UNMIK's
legal system, see GJYLBEHARE MURATI, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND ITS ROLE IN THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION USING THE CASE OF Kosovo 6-9,
available at http://www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/Murati.PDF; OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 47, at 8-9.
60.
OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 12-23; OMBUDSPERSON
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 8-14.
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parallel system for civil matters internal to the Serb community or likewise61for
any civil question requiring Serbian authentication for outside recognition.
Although the overall pattern of civil cases in the Serbian parallel system
has been one of a decreasing caseload and narrowing role, the thousands of
Serbian parallel civil judgments over the last seven years underpin many of
the economic and social arrangements of Kosovo society. Even if the Serbian
parallel system were to disappear entirely today, that legacy would remain,
and it must somehow be absorbed into Kosovo's official legal system.
2.

In Criminal Cases

Criminal prosecutions in the Serbian parallel courts operate according to
a different dynamic than the civil cases. Rather than being instigated by
litigants' choice of the Serbian parallel court venue like the civil cases, they
are an exercise of police authority by the Serbian state. As such, they pose a
direct challenge to UNMIK's control over Kosovo's always precarious
stability and security. While UNMIK has generally ignored the Serbian
parallel courts' civil judgments, it has taken steps to eliminate, so far as
possible, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Serbian parallel courts. In
2003, KFOR ordered the Serbian parallel courts in the enclaves to stop
handling criminal cases. 62 Since then, it appears that the Serbian parallel
courts within Kosovo have stopped hearing criminal cases, at least for the
most part, and perhaps entirely.
The Serbian parallel district courts in Serbia, however, have reportedly
continued to hear criminal cases, asserting jurisdiction over defendants who
have crossed into Serbia proper and are arrested there, as well as holding trials
in absentia in a few instances. 64 Particularly in cases involving inter-ethnic
crimes and war crimes, these trials have severe social ramifications, especially
because the defendants in the Serbian parallel courts are virtually always

61.
Overall, the Serbian parallel courts in the enclaves now reportedly deal primarily with
family matters and civil and commercial lawsuits against businesses that are based in Serbia and do
some business in Kosovo or otherwise involve the Serb community. While there are Serbian parallel
property cadastres, it is said that property sales are more typically registered with the UNMIK
authorities now than with the Serbian parallel system. The Serbian parallel administrative offices also
facilitate travel documents, license plates, and keep records of court decisions and property and personal
transactions certified by the courts. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note
29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31.
62. Interview with Michael Scheutz, Chief, Rule of Law Section, Department of Human
Rights and Rule of Law, Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., in Prigtina/Prishtine (May 27, 2005)
(speaking solely in his personal capacity and not as a representative of the OSCE). Notably, although the
Serbian parallel court judges interviewed for the 2003 OSCE report contended that the number of
criminal cases in the Serbian parallel system was diminishing, the majority of pending cases filed after
1999 were criminal: 527 out of 702. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 19-21.

63.
While most individuals I interviewed asserted that the Serbian parallel courts within
Kosovo had entirely stopped hearing criminal cases, there was one report that at least some criminal
cases continue. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview,
supra note 29; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36.
64.
While most interviewees agreed that the Serbian parallel courts located in Serbia continue
to hear criminal cases, there was one report that they have also stopped hearing criminal cases. Baruti
Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Deja &
Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36.
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Serb. 65 Inter-ethnic cases are not likely to be great in number, in light of the
division between Kosovo Albanian and Serb communities. However, when
instances of inter-ethnic violence do occur, they can set off a volatile
response, as evidenced by the rioting and attacks on the Serb community
instigated by media-driven rumors of Serbian involvement in the drowning
deaths of three Albanian children in March 2004. 66 In an atmosphere of
heightened inter-ethnic tension, each such case has a disproportionate impact,
undermining Serbs' confidence in UNMIK's ability to ensure their personal
67
security and in its ability to provide justice for invasions of that security.
The parallel criminal systems create risks for defendants as well, as
criminal defendants tried in one system do not thereby find themselves
protected against a second prosecution in the other. 68 As in the civil cases,
even if the Serbian parallel courts were to stop hearing all criminal cases now,
the legacy of past criminal judgments would somehow need to be addressed
by the UNMIK system, which would need to determine whether to re-try
defendants within its jurisdiction whose cases have already been heard in the
Serbian parallel courts. However, in doing so, it would face the challenges
discussed in the Subsection on civil cases above, as well as others particular to
the criminal context. The Kosovo Ombudsperson reports that the effectiveness
of the UNMIK courts in criminal cases is limited by systemic lack of
cooperation from victims and witnesses as a result of law enforcement's
failure to protect them, by inadequate jail space for those convicted and
sentenced to prison
time, as well as by problems of corruption within the
69

judicial system.

3.

PoliticalSignificance

Of course, it is not only possible but ordinary for multiple judicial
systems to co-exist in the same territory, as occurs, for example, in some
federal systems. However, this requires agreement regarding jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments, as well as some degree of comity, none of which is
present here. To the contrary, not only has there been no consensus on these
issues, but the two systems are explicitly founded on non-recognition and
represent competing claims to sovereignty over Kosovo.
The political strategizing that surrounds the parallel courts is one
indication of their political significance. As one example, in order to maintain
its foothold in the province, the Serbian government has been paying
substantially higher salaries to the judicial officers working in the Serbian
parallel courts within Kosovo than to those working in the ordinary court
65.
Few Albanians are comfortable crossing the border into Serbia proper, due to continuing
security concerns, so that de facto most defendants who are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in
Serbia proper are Serbs. Pantovic Interview, supranote 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.
66. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 19-20; Kosovo Reflects on
Riots of One Year Ago (Voice of America broadcast Mar. 16, 2005), transcriptavailableat 2005 WLNR
4085156; Neil Barnett, Albanians Posed as Serbs to Stoke Ethnic Firesin Kosovo, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

(London), Mar. 28, 2004, at 26.
67.
68.
69.

OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11.
See discussion infra Part IV.
OMBUSDPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 22-23.
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system in Serbia, thereby inducing them to remain at their posts. 70 For its part,
while UNMIK has tended to ignore the Serbian parallel court system by and
large, it has tried to persuade Serb judges and lawyers to transfer to the
UNMIK system. To this end, it has held certain positions open for Serb
candidates,
for example, and established courts and offices within the Serb
71
enclaves.
It is also important to recognize that while the functioning of these two
systems side by side has created problems for both Serbia and UNMIK, it has
offered some benefits to both sides as well. For Belgrade, it has served as an

expression of a continuing claim to administration in Kosovo that is symbolic
and practical, but not so obtrusive a challenge to UNMIK authority as to spur
a confrontation. It serves also as a continuing commitment to the Serbs in
Kosovo that they will not be abandoned by the state. For although the Serbian
parallel courts claim jurisdiction over all of Kosovo, in fact they function like
courts everywhere and take only those cases that come to them,
72 and those who
bring the cases are generally, although not exclusively, Serb.
For UNMIK, these courts and other aspects of the Serbian parallel
administration have long filled a gap in UNMIK capabilities by serving the
needs of a discrete, often hostile population that also poses the logistical
problem of an additional working language. 73 For a long time, UNMIK had its
hands full attempting to administer the province for the relatively cooperative
Kosovo Albanian population, and only recently has it been in a position to
consider fully extending its reach to the Serb population. 74 While UNMIK has
been making efforts to integrate Serbs into its administration, to some extent
the existence of this Serbian parallel administration has been a benefit to
UNMIK by providing some continuity in government in a land that UNMIK
took over largely from a state of chaos.
While for the most part UJNMIK and Serbia are at a stalemate over the
Serbian parallel courts, in a couple of exceptional instances they have resolved
some narrow part of the conflict. In July 2002, Serbia and UNMIK reached an
70.

It is not certain whether Serbia continues to do so today. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES

REPORT, supra note 16, at 21; see also Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Baruti Interview, supra note

3 1; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.
71.
OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17; OSCE TENTH MINORITY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 29-32. UNMIK has not issued any direction to its courts as to how to
handle judgments or communications coming from the Serbian parallel systems. It did establish a
working group to address the problem in 2003; however, there has been no officially reported action
since then. In 2003, the OSCE proposed a three-pronged approach to diminishing the role of the Serbian
parallel system, including reducing demand through a public awareness campaign, reducing supply by
assessing the Serbian parallel court caseload for future transfer and by improving working conditions for
Serb judges within the UNMIK system, and enforcing policy by recognizing Serbian parallel court
judgments up to the date when UNMIK opened courts in several Serb enclaves in 2003. OSCE
PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5-9.
72.
Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; 2005 PUBLIC OPINION
SURVEY, supra note 46, at 8, 21 (indicating that 41% of Serbs surveyed "do not recognize the [UNMIK]
courts in Kosovo," and 80% of Serbs surveyed "follow Serbian law").
73.
While UNM[K and Provisional Institution of Self-Government documents are to be issued
in both Albanian and Serbian as well as English, this is still aspirational in many instances, and there are
often significant delays in translation. See OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at
8-9; see also Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35.
74.
In a 2005 public opinion survey, public opinion survey, only 18% of Serbs reported
having confidence in UNMIK. 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 14.
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agreement to permit Serbian parallel court judges to transfer to the UNMIK
courts if they so desire. Under this agreement, Serbia continues to pay the
judges' higher Serbian benefits and pensions so that the judges do not incur
the severe financial penalty of losing their pensions by switching teams. This
was an entirely pragmatic compromise with the purpose of resolving one
obstacle to the integration of Serb judges into the UNMIK system: that no one
was going to be willing to give 75 their own personal financial security to
facilitate UNMIK's political goals. In another rare instance of cooperation,
one U.N. agency, the Housing and Property Directorate ("HPD"), reached an
agreement with the Serbian government permitting HPD access to all of
Serbia's records, including those from the parallel system, access that is not
available to UNMIK otherwise. A contributing factor in this agreement is that
rather than addressing the highly politicized questions of ethnic discrimination
in pre- and post-1999 land transfers, H{PD has a narrow, technical mandate:
confirming the accuracy of claims of title as of 1999 against Serbian records
and outside sources. 76

These instances of cooperation are highly unusual, representing a
complete departure from the usual policy of non-recognition and noninteraction. But while the success of each endeavor seems to be tied to the
particular circumstances and is the result of political negotiations and
strategies that are inaccessible to the external observer, there is at least one
observable commonality. In each case, an issue was isolated from broader
political concerns and treated as a discrete pragmatic question to be resolved
independently. This provides some basis for optimism concerning an approach
to the question of recognition of Serbian parallel court judgments that treats it
as a narrow legal issue to be resolved independently of the associated political
questions, according to legal rather than political principles.
III.

CIVIL JUDGMENTS

Viewed from the perspective of a post-conflict administration,
recognizing and enforcing the Serbian parallel court systems' civil judgments
might help to promote transitional goals of instituting rule of law or at least
establishing social stability.77 First and foremost, doing so would be to the
immediate benefit of the people of Kosovo who have been relying on these
courts for their personal matters, large and small. It would institute legal
certainty for the thousands of decisions made in the Serbian parallel system
and forestall any opportunity for unscrupulous parties to take advantage of the
potential for inconsistent rulings to defraud others trapped between the two
75.
Other conditions of the agreement included HPD's promise to "use its best endeavours" to
resolve the recruited judges' and prosecutors' property claims, UNMIK's assurance of "individualized
security assessments" for the recruits, and Serbia's assurance that they could return to positions in Serbia
in the future. OSCE TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 22. What Serbia got out of the
bargain, apart from relief from the burden of paying recruited judges' salaries, is unclear. An OSCE
report indicates that eleven Serbian judges had moved to the UNMIK system as of late 2003, while my
contacts indicated there were fewer than eleven in the UNMIK system as of May 2005. OSCE
PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 21; Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic
Interview, supra note 31.
76. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31.
77. See generally Teitel, supra note 13.
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systems. 78 On the larger social and political scale, such recognition could help
to restore confidence in future judgments and in the legal system as a whole,
as well as relieving one element of pressure on the ongoing negotiations over
Kosovo's political status. If accusations of systemic unfairness or
discrimination should arise, the consequences of such a result for confidence
in the transition toward rule of law would force revisitation of these
conclusions. At this point, however, without indicators of such problems, the
reports of injustice focus on the gaps in enforcement created by nonrecognition between the systems.
In this context, there is an important difference between the parallel
courts' civil and family law judgments, which are addressed in this Section,
and the judgments that concern property and criminal law, addressed in
following Sections. The substance of parallel court judgments on civil and
family law relate for the most part to private business and personal disputes
and not, as do the property and criminal judgments, to the catalysts of the
Serbian-Albanian conflict or the goals of transitional justice. 79 The transitional
justice concerns raised by recognition of the Serbian parallel courts' civil
judgments thus relate primarily to the role of the parallel courts as institutions
and the social and political effects of non-recognition, rather than to the
substance of the judgments at issue.
Viewed from the perspective of ordinary law, Kosovo's parallel courts
present a particularly acute and politicized version of an everyday legal
problem not particular to the transitional justice process: whether and how to
recognize legal decisions reached outside the auspices of the state-run judicial
system. Indeed, courts face this issue all the time, when a plaintiff files an
action seeking to enforce an arbitration award, a foreign judgment, or an outof-court settlement agreement, or when a defendant raises such a judgment or
agreement as res judicata barring a second claim on the same facts.
In the civil context, there are several legal models for recognizing these
judgments in ways that will safeguard the rights and interests of the involved
parties, as well as the core concepts of justice from which the judicial process
derives its legitimacy. Of these, arbitration awards and settlements attain their
legitimacy from the consent of the parties to resolve their dispute through
arbitration or agreement, rather than from the inherent jurisdiction vested in a
judicial institution. In addition, the fact that such out-of-court resolutions are
recognized demonstrates that states can and do recognize certain private
78.
Of course, the risk that litigants will try to game gaps in recognition between systems to
their advantage is inherent in any systems lacking complete mutual recognition. In Kosovo, there were
allegations that miscreants had carried out fraudulent land transfers by playing on the lack of common
property records and mutual non-recognition of property transfers to claim and transfer title to land they
did not actually own. While it would certainly have been possible to carry out fraudulent transfers under
such circumstances, no one with whom I spoke was in possession of specific evidence to substantiate or
disprove these allegations. See interview with Dara Katz, Senior Human Rights Advisor (Property),
Human Rights and Rule of Law, Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., in Prigtina/Prishtine (May 26,
2005) [hereinafter Katz Interview]; Baruti Interview, supra note 31. The OSCE has also identified this
as a risk of a formal policy of non-recognition. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16,
at 22 ("[S]ome might take advantage of the uncertainty and stop paying alimony, or stop paying off
loans, or attempt to seize transferred property").
79.
See generally DANIEL LEWIS, UNHABITAT, CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE: LAND
DISPUTES FOLLOWING CONFLICT (2004).
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judgments without ceding general jurisdiction, much less territorial
sovereignty, in doing so. These models also offer a principle-consentagainst which to assess the fairness of recognizing such judgments that could
be applied to the Serbian parallel court decisions.
The models for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitration awards, and
out-of-court settlements also offer useful technical solutions that could be
adapted to Kosovo's situation. In reviewing these decisions, courts confront
the same kinds of concerns that arise now in Kosovo: conflicting judgments,
questions about jurisdiction, concerns regarding the impartiality and fairness
of non-state tribunals, and so on. The factors that other states have identified
as being determinative for deciding recognition in any given case provide
guidance as to the kinds of cases that can profitably be recognized and the
appropriate considerations and trade-offs in doing so. The processes and
standards that they have adopted are relevant for the Serbian parallel
judgments in Kosovo as well.
Finally, because these mechanisms have received widespread acceptance
amongst European states and in the European Union, they also represent
models that have already been legitimized and accepted by the international
community in which both Serbia and Kosovo are eager to participate. 8° Using
models that are accepted as the norm within Europe therefore provides an
external incentive for all the concerned parties-Serbia, Kosovo, and the
international community itself-to accept the proposed resolution.
While the technical details contained within these models help to
illustrate how Kosovo could go about recognizing the parallel court judgments
if it chose to do so, in the end, it is not these details that are crucial but rather
the fact that there are such models that can facilitate recognition of the parallel
court judgments while mitigating the risks of doing so. In short, the following
of
models confirm that the Serbian parallel civil judgments are susceptible
81
so:
doing
to
obstacles
the
of
spite
in
enforcement,
and
recognition
legal
80. Press Conference, Serbian Government, Citizens Favour Serbia's Membership in EU
(Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=28598; The Officer of the Prime Minister
of Kosovo, EU-Kosova Relations, http://www.ks-gov.net/pm/?menuid=9&subid=4&lingo=2.
In selecting the models to review here, I have looked to European, U.S., and international
81.
law. The rules accepted in the European Union and in European civil law states represent Kosovo's
immediate legal community and comprise systems that are relatively consonant with its own. Within
Europe, French law provides an approach that is grounded in a shared civil law structure, but at the same
time offers some counterpoint to the heavily German-influenced Yugoslavian law that Kosovo has
largely retained for now. Because the U.S. rules on foreign judgments apply to all foreign states rather
than solely those to which it has a close relation, its concerns and solutions provide a useful contrast to
European approaches. Finally, where there is international consensus in the form of a multilateral
convention, I have taken account of this as well.
Ordinarily, it would be appropriate to look first to the law of the concerned state. However,
unwilling to make use of the Serbian laws that were in place at the time of the conflict in 1999, Kosovo
has reverted temporarily to the pre-1989 law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for
its law on recognition of civil judgments, among others. As such, the law currently in force in Kosovo
does not represent the modern approach to these issues, which has developed considerably more detailed
rules and streamlined proceedings over the last 20 years. Nor does it represent current or future
preferences on these issues: the adoption of the pre-1989 law was merely an interim measure by the
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to place some law on the books, and the
provisional legislature is in the process of drafting new laws and codes across all areas of the legal
system. Finally, because Kosovo is not a state, it is not a party to the relevant international treaties on
these subjects. Accordingly, while I do review the relevant provisions from the SFRY law currently
applicable in Kosovo, I do not discuss those provisions at any length.
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" Arbitration: Recognition of international arbitration awards is
primarily governed by the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York
Convention"), 82 which has been ratified, acceded, and succeeded to
by over 130 states, including most if not all European states and all
the states that were once part of the former Yugoslavia. 83 The rules
for recognition of domestic arbitration awards comprise part of the
civil code and civil procedure code of most civil law countries, and
the U.S. federal system is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
There is considerable convergence amongst these rules as well. For
84
domestic arbitration, I consider French and U.S. law.
* Out-of-Court Settlements: Recognition of out-of-court settlements is
governed by domestic civil codes, by civil procedure codes, or by
common law, and is based upon principles of 85
contract law. Again, I
review the law of France and the United States.
"

Foreign Judgments: Recognition of the judgments of other member
states in the European Union is governed by European Council
Regulations. 86 For contrast, I also review the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act and the Revised Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which have been adopted by
a majority of U.S. states. 87 1 also review the provisions of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia law currently applied in
Kosovo that
address recognition and enforcement of foreign
88
judgments.

82.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3,
adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter New York Convention].
83.
See UNCITRAL Status of Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html
(last visited
Nov. 8, 2006) (listing countries that have signed, ratified, acceded, or succeeded to New York
Convention).
84.
On the French side, this encompasses the French Code of Civil Procedure and the French
Civil Code; on the American side, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2000).
85.
See CODE CIVIL [C. cv.] (Fr.); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 1 (2000).
86.
Council Regulation 805/2004, Creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested
Claims, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 (EC) [hereinafter Uncontested Claims Regulation]; Council Regulation
44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation]; Council
Regulation 2201/2003, Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC) [hereinafter
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation].
87.
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1994) [hereinafter
RECOGNITION ACT]; REV. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1994)
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT ACT]; VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, 2 LITIGATION OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 20:3, at 20-8 (2d ed. 2006).

88.
Provisions under the SFRY law currently applicable in Kosovo concerning recognition
and execution of arbitration awards and out of court settlements are too limited to provide the
information necessary for this comparative analysis. Therefore, I focus here on the provisions
concerning foreign judgments, which are more extensive. Law on Executive Procedure, Official Gazette
of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo. no. LU/1369/SE/ED (1982) (translation provided by author);
Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo. no.
43/82 at 1077 (translation provided by author).
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This Section begins with case studies of two recent civil cases that
illustrate the issues at stake. It then proceeds topic by topic through the
relevant aspects of arbitration, out-of-court settlement, and foreign judgment
models, beginning with the question of sovereignty, then reviewing the
respective default rules, and finally considering the grounds for nonenforcement of these judgments. By adapting certain aspects from several of
the models, UNMIK or the Kosovo government could develop a workable
mechanism for recognizing most Serbian parallel judgments in a way it deems
appropriate.
A.

Two Civil Cases

UNMIK has no official policy on recognition of Serbian courts' civil
judgments, but its de facto position is that there has been and is to be no
recognition. 89 However, in individual cases, compelled by the equities of the
situation, UNMIK courts and other administrative bodies find themselves
90
pressed to determine how to address Serbian parallel court decisions.
In one currently pending case, for example, a Serb employee filed a
claim in the Serbian courts within Kosovo for wrongful discharge against his
former employer. After pursuing the claim in that system for four years, he
received an adverse appellate decision that sent his case back for retrial in the
trial court. Without withdrawing his first claim in the Serbian court, he then
filed suit in the UNMIK court on the same grounds in 2005. When the
defendant protested, producing the Serbian court judgments, the plaintiff
asserted 9that
he was not aware that he could file in the UNMIK courts until
1
recently.
In spite of the UNMIK policy, the judge hesitated to proceed with the
case in the face of the prior Serbian parallel judgments. Principles of fairness
to the defendant, which had already defended its interests for four years in the
Serbian courts, seemed to demand that the judgments of the Serbian courts be
recognized, particularly since the plaintiff voluntarily pursued his claim there
in the first place and did not seem to claim that the Serbian parallel courts
made errors of procedure or law in their judgments. Not only this, if the judge
were to allow the case to continue, she would risk exacerbating the already
complex situation in the end, when both courts would produce their separate
89. See OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 13, 21.
90.
The few official reports available on the parallel system describe civil cases raising similar
issues to those discussed here. E.g., OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 23
(explaining that a litigant was unable to enforce Serbian parallel court decision on compensation for
expropriation in UNMIK court). The OSCE also reported that two individual Serbian parallel court
presidents informed it that they had caseloads of hundreds of civil cases and inheritance proceedings
between 1999-2003. Id. at 19-20. However, neither official judgments and other individual case
records nor statistical or other general data are available for the Serbian parallel courts civil cases, so
that it is impossible to offer any specific information on the number or nature of the civil cases in the
system. This is not happenstance, of course, but one more product of the same dynamic that has created
the legal and pragmatic problems discussed in this article: the mutual non-recognition between the
systems.
91.
Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Second Interview with Anonymous #11, in
Prigtina/Prishtind (May 26, 2005) (interviewee requested anonymity as a condition of providing this
information).
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judgments, one of which could be enforced in Serbia and the other in Kosovo,
without regard
for whether they might constitute a double penalty for the
92
defendant.
The UNMIK courts' inconsistent and unpredictable approach to
recognition and enforcement of Serbian court judgments has exacerbated
uncertainty, confusion, and opportunities for arbitrage. This is also illustrated
by another Serbian parallel court case. Here, a Serbian parallel court in
Kosovo issued a divorce and ordered the husband to pay alimony. When he
failed to do so, the Serbian parallel court had no means to enforce the alimony
judgment against him, so his ex-wife went to an UNMIK court to enforce it.
That court refused to enforce the judgment on the grounds that Serbian
parallel court decisions were invalid. However, at around the same time, the
UNMIK offices in Leposavid/Leposaviq recognized the judgment as requested
by the ex-husband for purposes of declaring him an unmarried person. When
the plaintiff, thwarted in her effort to enforce the original divorce decree, then
filed a new complaint for divorce on the same grounds and with the same
conditions in the UNMIK court in Mitrovicd/Mitrovica, her ex-/husband
successfully defended on the grounds that the divorce had already been
recognized by UNMIK,93and that to divorce him again would be in conflict
with that determination.
These cases illustrate that in the context of the Serbian parallel civil
judgments, certainty and predictability are the dominant concerns. The parties
in these cases do not contest the fairness of the Serbian parallel proceeding;
rather it is the existence of the opportunity for multiple proceedings that
creates confusion and harm. Indeed, the balance of interests is so much in
favor of certainty in this context that arguably it would be better for UNMIK
to adopt a rule-any rule-regarding Serbian parallel court judgments than
none at all, so that at least its own approach would be internally consistent and
it would be more difficult for parties to abuse legal processes. Fortunately,
UNMIK has ample models to draw from in constructing a rule for addressing
the civil judgments of the Serbian parallel courts.
B.

Bypassing Sovereignty as the Basisfor Jurisdiction.

A central obstacle to recognition of Serbian parallel civil judgments is
not the characteristics of the judgments themselves, but UNMIK's
determination to avoid taking any steps that would seem to affirm Serbian
parallel court jurisdiction over the territory of Kosovo, either in the past or in
the future. While state authority is an essential prerequisite for recognition of
foreign judgments, it is not relevant to recognition of arbitration awards and
out-of-court settlements. In such cases, the legal foundation for recognition of
the judgment or settlement is the initial agreement of the parties to decide the
matter by arbitration or contract, rather than any inherent, broader jurisdiction
92.
Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Second Interview with Anonymous #11, in
PrigtinaIPrishtind (May 26, 2005) (interviewee requested anonymity as a condition of providing this
information).
93.
First Interview with Anonymous #11, in Prigtina/Prishtind (May 23, 2005) (interviewee
requested anonymity as a condition of providing this information).

ParallelCourts

2007]

based in the authority of the state. By treating Serbian parallel court
judgments either as arbitration awards or as out-of-court settlements, Kosovo
could leapfrog the crucial question of sovereignty and facilitate the
recognition of Serbian parallel judgments without conceding the Serbian
parallel courts' legitimacy as such. Indeed, treating Serbian parallel court
judgments as arbitration agreements or out-of-court settlements would signal
exactly the contrary conclusion: that the courts do not have any independent
jurisdiction, but rather, are dependent upon the acquiescence of the parties for
any jurisdiction over civil matters.
Here, comparing the international and domestic rules on recognition of
arbitration awards, out-of-court settlements, and foreign judgments reveals the
contrast between the approaches:
Table 1: Recognized Bases for Original Tribunal's Jurisdiction

Basis for
original
tribunal's or
parties'
jurisdiction

N.Y.
Convention on

French and
U.S. Law on

French and U.S.
Law on Out of

E.C. Regs. on
Member State

U.S. Uniform
Acts on

Former SFRY
Law on

International
Arbitration
Parties' consent,
as expressed in
arbitration
94
agreement

Domestic
Arbitration
Parties'
consent, as
expressed in
arbitration
9
agreement

Court
Settlements
Parties' consent,
capacity to
consent, &
authority over the
relevant

Judgments

Foreign
Judgments
Recognition
Act:
sovereignty:
Foreign court
has juris.
Enforcement

Foreign
Judgments
Sovereignty:
Official court
decision or
equivalent
under law of
foreign state"

rights/objects

Type of case
that can be
subject to
such a
judgment

Typically
commercial
disputes, but
also some other
non-criminal
disputes' °°

Typically
commercial
disputes, but
also many
other noncriminal
disputes'o'

Many noncriminal
disputes 10 2

6

Sovereignty:
original court
has jurisdiction
under the
relevant E.C.
97
regulation

Many noncriminal
disputes0 3

Act:
Dependent on
recognition"
Recognition
Act: Solely
money
judgments
Enforcement
Act: Any
judgment'_ 4

Many noncriminal
disputes °'

94. New York Convention, supra note 82, art. Il(1).
95.
N.C.P.C., arts. 1442-50 (Fr.); C. civ., arts. 2059-61 (Fr.); see generally Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2000).
96. C. CiV. art. 2045 (Fr.), 15A AM.JUR.2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 2, 9-10, 39 (2000).
97. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 2-26; Matrimonial/Parental
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 2-3, 6-14. Because the regulation on uncontested money
judgments deals primarily with default judgments, it sets minimum standards of notice and service to the
defendant, rather than rules ofjurisdiction. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 12-18.
98.
RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 4(a)(2)-(3); ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2.
99.
Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86-87; Law on Executive Procedure, Official Gazette of the Socialist
Fed. Republic of Yugo. no. LU/1369/SE/ED, art. 12 (1982).
100. Non-commercial jurisdiction is determined by national laws. New York Convention,
supranote 82, art. II.
101. E.g., C. CiV. arts. 2059-60 (Fr.); N.C.P.C., arts. 1442 & 1448 (Fr.); Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
102. C. cIv. arts. 2044 & 2046 (Fr.); N.C.P.C., art. 127 (Fr.); 15A AM.JUR.2D Compromise and
Settlement §§ 5, 38 & 40 (2000).
103. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 1; Matrimonial/Parental
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86; Uncontested Claims Regulation, supranote 87, art. 2.
104. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § I (excluding taxes, fines, & family support);
ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 1.
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The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements underlines the notion
that the parties' consent provides not just a possible but a desirable basis for
recognizing and enforcing judgments. The Convention is the most recently
concluded international consensus on the subject and has not yet entered into
force.10 6 When it does so, the Convention will extend the principle of consent
to determining the jurisdiction of ordinary state courts, permitting parties to
certain international disputes to select their preferred forum from among the
courts of the states parties to the Convention by entering into exclusive choice
of court agreements. 107 It will require courts to respect the choice of the
parties insofar as possible under relevant law and provides for mandatory
recognition and enforcement
of judgments on that basis, albeit with some
10 8
exceptions and limits.
Furthermore, a recognition mechanism that extended the arbitration and
out-of-court settlement recognition models from their usual contexts to the
Serbian parallel courts' civil judgments would not be cut from whole cloth.
Other states have used arbitration award and contract models to recognize the
judgments of non-state institutions, such as the decisions of religious judges
and tribunals. 109 In deploying these models, courts have grounded the
legitimacy of religious institutions' legal decisions in the same basis as the
legitimacy of arbitration awards and contracts: the consent of the parties.
Indeed, a paramount consideration is assessing the genuine agreement of the
parties to participate in and be governed by the relevant religious law. In
doing so, courts have used the standard tools of contract law that are used to
assess consent in the arbitration and settlement contexts. 0
Nor does recognizing decisions from alternative institutions on the basis
of the parties' agreement mean accepting any decision reached on that basis,
even if fraudulent, made under duress, or otherwise fundamentally unjust.
Instead, as will be discussed below, the rules for recognition of arbitration
agreements and out-of-court settlements offer ample grounds for refusing to
recognize a decision tainted by misconduct or malfeasance. The use of such
rules in the context of these other, non-state tribunals and decisions is wellestablished and indeed, crucial to recognition and enforcement: Courts have
refused to enforce religious decisions in cases where they found duress or
other forms of pressure, a failure to meet minimal requirements of due
105. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86, 93-94.
106. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter
Choice of Court Convention] (not yet in force).
107. Id. arts. 1-4.
108. Id. arts. 5-9.
109. U.S. and Canadian courts have used arbitration agreements and contract law to enforce
rabbinic decisions on marriage and family issues and to recognize religious marriages that do not meet
the formal requirements of the civil system. Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in
American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 578-86 (2004) (U.S.); Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and
the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGiLL
L.J. 49, 73-77 (2005) (Can.). States have also used the recognition of foreign judgments model to
recognize judgments of tribal courts and other entities with at least limited sovereignty. E.g., Gordon K.
Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1397, 1410-11 (1985).
110. Estin, supra note 109, at 585.
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process, or where important elements of public policy are absent,1 such as
consideration of the interests of the children in a divorce proceeding. I
Following these models, Kosovo could ground its recognition of Serbian
parallel court civil judgments on the basis of the voluntary agreement of the
parties to participate in the Serbian parallel proceedings, rather than in the
asserted territorial jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts. In Kosovo's case,
ascertaining such agreement would likely be approached most effectively in a
categorical, formalistic way, presuming the acquiescence of the parties in all
cases in which both parties actively participated, on the basis of the plaintiffs
decision to file and the defendant's decision to appear in the Serbian parallel
court. This approach would have the advantage of creating widespread legal
certainty regarding Serbian parallel judgments instantaneously and of being
easily applied to a large number of cases at once.
Of course, this consent would be in at least some cases a legal fiction. In
the context of arbitration and out-of-court settlements, both parties have in
fact agreed to the out-of-court resolution of their dispute with the option of an
in court resolution before them. For cases heard in the early years of the
UNMIK administration, the parties will often have had no alternative but the
Serbian parallel courts, and so their consent can readily be presumed. In later
years, however, at least some defendants will likely have had a preference for
the UNMIK courts that they had no opportunity to express. Even under a
categorical, formulaic approach that presumes willing participation, it would
be possible to offer the opportunity for parties to request individual
reconsideration of their cases, for example, if a defendant could present
evidence of nonconsent such as nonparticipation or active protest of parallel
court jurisdiction. However, based on the reports of those I interviewed and
the formal reports and assessments of the situation in Kosovo, a formulaic
approach seems likely to capture the reality that in most instances, the parties
were in fact willing to make use of the Serbian parallel system to resolve their
disputes.
This determination could, however, also be made in a case-by-case
review of the indications of the parties' consent. This would have the
advantage of permitting reconsideration of cases in which parties felt
pressured to use the Serbian parallel courts or did not realize that they had an
alternative. However, such case-by-case assessment would be highly
burdensome, especially for an already backlogged judiciary. Furthermore, the
courts are not likely to have access to independent evidence of the parties'
intent beyond the testimony of the parties themselves, as it is unlikely that any
record remains of the parties' positions at the time. This would make it
difficult to find a basis for resolving conflicting claims. Accordingly, this
approach might well introduce more uncertainty than it resolves, as well as
offering opportunities for disgruntled litigants to use the review process to
reopen their claims.
Applying a consent-based approach to the employment and divorce
cases discussed above would provide a basis for recognizing the Serbian
parallel court judgment in both cases. To the extent that it is possible to
111.

Id. at 584-85.
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ascertain consent after the fact, the parties seem to have voluntarily
participated in the Serbian parallel proceedings, and it was not until an
opportunity for forum-shopping arose that parties sought to remove
themselves from those proceedings. Under either a categorical rule looking to
whether the parties in fact took part in the case or a more detailed analysis of
the agreement of these individual parties, Kosovo could base its recognition of
the Serbian parallel judgments in these cases on the parties' agreement and
bypass the question of Serbian parallel court territorial jurisdiction over their
claims.
C.

Frameworkfor Recognition: A Default Rule andExceptions

There is considerable consensus, especially among European states, on
the standards and procedures for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitral
awards, and out-of-court settlements. While states deploy a range of standards
and procedures for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitral awards, and out-ofcourt settlements (as discussed in Section III.D below), most use the same
basic framework: a default rule either for or against recognition, with certain
exceptions. Where there is no law or agreement in place on recognition of
foreign judgments, the default rule is against recognition, as it is concerning
the Serbian parallel court judgments in Kosovo. As is occurring now in
Kosovo, the legal uncertainty this creates and the associated social, economic,
and judicial burdens have provided an incentive for states to develop a
streamlined and determinative approach to recognition of these judgments and
other agreements. 112 In passing laws regarding recognition of non-state
judgments and agreements, therefore, states typically set a new default rule at
the opposite extreme, mandating full recognition for legitimate judgments and
agreements, and then limiting that recognition with enumerated grounds for
non-enforcement: 113

112. For example, both the European Council Regulations and the U.S. Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act refer to the interest in securing efficient common markets and
interchanges. See e.g., Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86; RECOGNITION ACT,
supra note 87, Prefatory Note, at 1.
113. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements discussed above in Section III.A also
takes the same approach. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 106, arts. 8-9.
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Table 2: Default Recognition Rules
N.Y.
Convention on
International
Arbitration
Mandatory
recognition of
international
arbitration
4
judgments"

Default
Rule

French and
U.S. Law on
Domestic
Arbitration
Awards are
immediately
final &
enforceable
by court order
5
(Fr.)11
Courts must
recognize &
enforce
awards
6

(U.S.)11

Basis for
nonrecognition
(discussed
below)

Narrow
enumerated
grounds

Broader
enumerated
grounds

French and
E.C. Regs.
U.S. Uniform
U.S. Law on
on Member
Acts on
Out of Court
State
Foreign
Settlements
Judgments
Judgments
Settlements are "Virtually
Recog. Act:
as binding as
automatic"
Foreign money
other contracts mandatory
judgments are
& judgments & recognition of "conclusive
enforceable as judgments of between the
''
private
E.C. member
parties"t
contracts
states"'
Enforce. Act:
17
(both)
Judgments are
enforceable by
same standards
& procedures as
U.S. state court
2
judgments
Grounds
Narrow
Broader
defined
enumerated
enumerated
primarily by
grounds
grounds
contract law

Former SFRY
Law on Foreign
Judgments
SFRY court will
recognize
presented foreign
court decisions
from reciprocating
states; such judicial
recognition is
necessary for
enforcement"'

Broader
enumerated
grounds

Establishing such a default rule, while efficient, would, of course,
reverse the current presumption concerning the Serbian parallel courts in
Kosovo. It also may appear at first glance to provide no opportunity to address
UNMIK's concerns regarding conflicting judgments, partiality, and so on.
But while the default rules appear absolute and uniform, they do not
determine the level of recognition that each model actually offers. Rather, as
discussed below, the level of scrutiny applied to the judgment or agreement in
determining recognition varies considerably between the models according to
the process and grounds for contesting recognition. Indeed, precisely because
the default rules are so strongly in favor of recognition, it is the exceptions
that determine the true scope of the rule and define the relevant issues for

whether a judgment should be recognized.
The benefit of establishing a pro-recognition default rule, of course, is
creating immediate certainty in the judgments issued in the majority of cases

and also increasing efficiency for litigants and courts alike in enforcing those
judgments. Accordingly, this approach is most beneficial when there are many
114.
115.
116.
117.

New York Convention, supra note 82, art. 3.
C. civ. arts. 1476-78 (Fr.).
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
C. civ. arts. 2044, 2052 (Fr.); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 32, 37, 39

(2000).
118. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl. 1 17. The E.U. requires
mandatory, automatic recognition of the judgments of the courts of member states upon the mere
presentation by the enforcing party of the relevant paperwork. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra
note 86, arts. 5-6, 20; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 41;
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supranote 86, art. 21.
119. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 3.
120. ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2.
121. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86-87, 92, 96.
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cases that can properly be enforced under such a default rule, and only a few
cases that will present grounds for non-enforcement. To some extent,
therefore, the choice of default rule should depend on an assessment of the
standard that is likely to accurately capture the majority of cases.
D.

Grounds and Proceduresfor Non-Recognition

UNMIK's primary concern regarding recognizing Serbian parallel civil
judgments is, of course, the sovereignty claims discussed above. But there are
other concerns as well, among them the risk of recognizing conflicting
judgments; fears that Serbian parallel proceedings have suffered from
partiality, political decision-making or other lack of independence; and the
potential effects on the rights of third parties affected by the judgment but
unwilling or unable to participate in the Serbian parallel proceedings.
The models for recognition of foreign judgments, arbitral awards, and
out-of-court settlements consider and address these concerns by providing a
set of enumerated grounds on which courts can decline to recognize otherwise
enforceable judgments. 122 While there is a broad range of enumerated
exceptions amongst the different models, the exceptions that are common to at
least two of the models (as described below) encompass the concerns that
UNMIK has raised in considering the problem of the Serbian parallel courts:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

conflict with another judgment;
lack of jurisdiction;
lack of opportunity for the defendant to participate;
public policy;
fraud; and 123

f) due process.

Another consideration that is raised solely in the context of domestic
arbitration agreements, but which deserves attention in light of the divided
society in which the Serbian parallel courts operate, is the effect on the rights
of third parties who did not have the opportunity to participate.

122. In the laws and agreements governing recognition of arbitration awards and of foreign
judgments, there are a limited, enumerated set of exceptions that provide a basis for a party to contest
recognition and enforcement. In the context of out of court settlements, the grounds for non-enforcement
are based primarily in contract law. The validity of this set of exceptions has been recently confirmed in
the Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, the most recently negotiated multilateral consensus on
enforcement of foreign judgments of courts chosen by the parties. With the exception of due process,
the Convention's enumerated grounds for non-enforcement are identical to this set of common grounds.
Choice of Court Convention, supra note 106, art. 9.
123.

See infra Table 3.

2007]

ParallelCourts

Table 3: Grounds for Non-Enforcement
Grounds for
nonenforcement:

New York
Convention
on
International
24
Arbitration'

French &
French & U.S.
U.S. Law on
Law on Out of
Court
Domestic
25
26
Arbitration'
Settlements'

Conflicting
judgments

Jurisdiction

Outside scope
of arbitration
agreement

Invalid/nonexistent;
Outside scope
of AA (Fr.,
U.S.
modifies);
Arbitrator
exceeded
powers (U.S.)

E.C. Regulations on
Member State
27
Judgments'

Conflicting
judgment
unknown to a
party (Fr.)

Conflicting
judgments: judgment
is"irreconcilable"
with certain other
judgments
concerning the same
29
parties'

Failure to
establish
essential
elements of
agreement
(U.S.);
Parties lacked
capacity or
authority (U.S.);
Made in
execution of a
void right (Fr.)

Conflict with special
jurisdictional
provisions only;
otherwise, the
recognizing/enforcing
court does not have
authority to
reconsider
jurisdiction and this
issue must be
litigated in the
original court'

U.S. Uniform
Foreign
Money
Judgments
Recognition
12 8
Act
Conflicting
judgments/prior
agreement to
senle

Lack of
personal or
subject-matter
jurisdiction

Former
SFRY Law
on Foreign
Judgments

SFRY court
hasissued a
conflicting
judgment or
has recognized
a foreign
court's
conflicting
3
judgment
SFRY court
has exclusive
jurisdiction'

124. New York Convention, supranote 82, art. V (all listed grounds).
125. C. CiV. arts. 1480, 1483 (Fr.) (all listed French grounds); Arbitration Act, supra note 84,
§§ 10-11 (all listed U.S. grounds).
126. C. civ. arts. 2053-56 (Fr.) (all listed French grounds); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and
Settlement §§ 34, 39, 41 (2000) (all listed U.S. grounds).
127. Because the process for recognizing and enforcing uncontested claims is even more
streamlined than the process for enforcing other judgments, the only ground for non-enforcement is a
conflicting judgment. Accordingly, except for conflicting judgments, this chart reflects the grounds
applicable in civil/commercial and matrimonial/parental cases. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra
note 86, art. 21; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 33-37;
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 22-26.
128. The Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not provide specific
grounds for non-enforcement, but rather, indicates that the judgment "is subject to the same procedures,
defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a [court] of this state."
ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2. Because these grounds for non-enforcement vary state by state,
this chart includes only the particular grounds set out by the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act. RECOGNITION ACT, supranote 87, § 4.
129. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 33-37; Matrimonial/Parental
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 22(c)-(d), 23(e)-(f).
130. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, art. 90.
131. These special jurisdictional provisions deal specifically with insurance cases, consumer
cases, cases designated for exclusive jurisdiction, and prior agreements by Member States concerning
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court is not permitted to review the original court's jurisdiction.
Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 35. However, the extensive rules on
jurisdiction established earlier in the Regulation stand; it is simply that they cannot be reconsidered postjudgment. Rather, "[t]he reasoning underlying the general prohibition of a review of the original court's
jurisdiction is that the court of origin is as well able to judge the applicability of the Brussels-Lugano
regime as the court of the state addressed, and better able than the latter to apply its own law." 1
EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE § 26.096, at 940-41 (Alexander Layton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004). That is,
enforcing the jurisdictional rules is primarily the responsibility of the original court, not the
recognizing/enforcing court, underlining the importance of mutual confidence between the courts of
member states.
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Grounds for
nonenforcement:

New York
Convention
on
International
24
Arbitration

French &
U.S. Law on
Domestic
25
Arbitration

Lack of
opportunity
for
defendant to
participate

Lack of
service or
notice to
defendant

All parties
have not been
involved (Fr.)

Lack of service or
notice to defendant
in default case

U.S. Uniform
Foreign
Money
Judgments
Recognition
28
Act'
Lack of timely
notice to
defendant

Public policy

Public policy

Public policy
(Fr.)

Public policy

Public policy

Fraud;
corruption
(U.S.)
Due process
(U.S.)

Fraud

Due process

French & U.S.
Law on Out of
Court
26
Settlements

E.C. Regulations on
Member State
27
Judgments

Fraud; duress
(Fr. & U.S.)

Fraud

-

Systemic
unfairness/lack
ofjudicial
independence

Former
SFRY Law
on Foreign
Judgments

"Irregularities"
such as lack of
service that
deprived
defendant of
opportunity133to
participate
Contrary to
SFRY social
systeml

Other

I.Constitution

3rd party can
file objection
in court (Fr.);
3rd party can
move to
vacate award
in certain
circuits (U.S.)
1. Arbitrator

1. Award not in

Forum non

I. Lack of

concerns

of arbitration

invalidly

writing (U.S.)

conveniens

reciprocity 1

panel violates
arbitration
agreement or
the law;
2. Award has
been set aside!
suspended or
is not yet
binding

appointed
(Fr.);
2. Form of
award (Fr.;
U.S. modifies)
3. Material
errors in
subject matter
(U.S.
modifies)

2. Illegality
(U.S.)
3. Mutual
mistake (U.S.)
Error re: person
or subject of
dispute (Fr.)
4. Reasonable
reliance on
misrepresentation
or omission

Third
parties'
rights

-

-

3

2. Special
rules for
personal status
36
cases'

during
negotiation
(U.S.)

Apart from the substantive grounds for contesting recognition, the other
crucial issue is the process available to do so. In the European Union,
confidence in member states' courts is relatively high in comparison to U.S.
132. However, in cases concerning marriage, the defendant can consent to recognition
nonetheless. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic of
Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, art. 89 (translation provided by author).
133. Id. at 1077, art. 88. In cases concerning personal status, this ground for non-recognition
applies only to citizens. Id. at 1077, art. 94.
134. Id. at 1077, art. 91. This ground for non-recognition also applies only to citizens in
personal status cases. See id. at 1077, art. 94.
135. Reciprocity is presumed unless there is reason to believe otherwise. There are exceptions
for cases concerning marriage or parenthood. Id. at 1077, art. 92.
136. The treatment of cases concerning personal status varies depending on the citizenship of
the parties, and there are additional opportunities for the parties to waive grounds for non-recognition.
Id. at 1077, arts. 92-95.
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confidence in foreign courts and Kosovo's confidence in the Serbian parallel
courts. 137 As such, the process set forth in the E.C. regulations favors
maximum efficiency: It is "virtually automatic;" the judgment shall be
declared enforceable "immediately on completion of the formalities," without
consideration of any of the grounds of non-recognition; and the defendant
"has no right to make any submission on the application" before it is declared
enforceable. 138 But in most other models, the initial proceeding is adversarial,
and the defendant has the opportunity to object to recognition and
enforcement and to raise grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement in
that initial proceeding.' 39 In essence, the more uncertainty exists about the
fairness of the original process and the impartiality of the original tribunal, the
more scrutiny the state will build into the process of determining recognition.
1.

Contrast between E. U. & U.S. ForeignJudgment Models

Here, it is worth comparing the contrasting rules applied by the E.U. and
the U.S. in recognition of foreign judgments, for they demonstrate both the
definitive role played by the exceptions to the general default rule and the
essential relationship between ease of recognition and certainty about the
legitimacy of the judgment. As to the first issue, the E.U.'s default rule in
favor of recognition is reinforced by the highly streamlined, almost automatic
137. Here, and at other points throughout this section, I refer to the relatively high level of
confidence amongst European courts and to the relatively high level of agreement on the terms and
conditions for recognition ofjudgment. Of course, the E.U. rules on recognition ofjudgments were topdown rules, created at the European Union level, and do not necessarily represent the subjective views
of all members. However, there is no doubt that the E.U. system is "based on the principle of mutual
trust between the legal systems and judicial institutions of the Member States .
I EUROPEAN CIVIL
1..."
PRACTICE, supra note 127, at 286. Nor are these comments meant to suggest that the process of
implementing these E.U. regulations is necessarily complete or absolute. The regulations do, however,
govern all members. See BERNHARD HOFSTOTTER, NON-COMPLIANCE OF NATIONAL COURTS: REMEDIES
INEUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND BEYOND 9-12, 41-42 (2005) (discussing the direct applicability of
E.U. law and the responsibility of national courts to issue decisions "in conformity with Community law
as interpreted by the ECJ" (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, while each member state may not
necessarily have a subjectively high level of confidence in the courts of another member state, it
nevertheless receives the benefits of the safeguards for minimum baselines of process provided by the
E.U. structures. It is also subject to the uniform requirements of the E.U. regulations in recognizing and
enforcing member state judgments and to the authority of the European Court of Justice. These
conditions put the European Union states in a different position from either the United States or Kosovo,
both in terms of relative levels of confidence in the judgments they enforce, relative levels of
willingness to enforce those judgments, and the kinds of safeguards that secure that willingness. For
discussions of various aspects of the development and implementation of the E.U. recognition and
enforcement rules, see, for example, Ronald A. Brand, The European Union 's New Role in International
Private Litigation, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 277 (2005); Nicholas Bala et al., Regulating CrossBorder Child Support Within Federated Systems, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 102
(2005); Yvonne N. Gierczyk, The Evolution of the European Legal System, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
153, 160-72 (2005); Catherine Kessedjian, Sir Kenneth Bailey Memorial Lecture: Dispute Resolution in
a Complex International Society, 29 MELB. U. L. REv. 765, 793-96 (2005); 1 EUROPEAN CIVIL
PRACTICE, supra note 127, at 276-371.
138. Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 31; Uncontested Claims
Regulation, supra note 86; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl. 17 & art.
41.
139. New York Convention, supra note 82 (following procedure of state where the judgment is
relied on); C. CiV. (Fr.) (no right of participation); 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12 (right of participation); 15A AM.
JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 49 (2000) (right of participation); RECOGNITION ACT, supra note
87 (right of participation); ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87 (follows procedure of enforcing state).

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32: 1

procedure described above, and a very narrow set of grounds for nonrecognition, whereas the similar U.S. default rule is limited by an adversarial
proceeding vesting considerable leeway in the judge to consider far broader
grounds for non-recognition.
As to the second issue, at the most fundamental level, this contrast in
procedures and safeguards is an expression of the essential difference between
the relationship amongst the E.U. member states and the relationship between
the United States and other foreign nations, a difference that bears upon the
choice of an appropriate model for Kosovo. The E.C. Regulations are founded
in the agreement of all member states to provide reciprocal recognition of
each other's judgments. The enforcement procedures described above are
limited to the relatively small number of states that are subject to a common
legal regime enforced through E.U. institutions, including the decisions of the
European Court of Justice, and that share relatively similar legal systems and
other common interests and incentives to compliance. The United States, in
contrast, is in a position far more analogous to Kosovo's. Lacking an
agreement for reciprocity in recognition of its judgments, the United States
applies its more stringent enforcement procedures to review the judgments of
all foreign states without the benefit of common interests or similar legal rules
and without the safeguards of an overarching legal and political structure.
In particular, the basis for the E.U.'s generous rule is two conditions that
are manifestly absent in Kosovo: agreement on jurisdiction and mutual
confidence, generated at least in part by the jurisdictional agreements and by
final interpretation in a single court (the European Court of Justice).140 The
E.C. Regulations ensure the first by setting out extensive jurisdictional rules
that must be met by the court issuing the original judgment for the judgment
to be recognized, and achieve the second by coordinating these agreements on
recognition with initiatives to create common minimum standards for
41
procedural protections and some degree of harmonization of national laws.
The benefit of this approach is obvious. By shifting the burden of ensuring
proper jurisdiction, procedural protections, and reasonably consonant
substantive rules to the front end, the E.U. achieves efficiency and certainty in
recognition practice. The trade-off is also obvious: The risk of enforcing
repugnant judgments should those preliminary safeguards fail. But as
discussed above, in the E.U. context, this risk is largely mitigated by the
existence of legal and political structures ensuring compliance with the
regulations' requirements.

11, 16.
140. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl.
141. Id. arts. 1(1), 2-24; Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 1, 314; KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, §§ 1-015 to 1-0 16 (Robert

Bray ed., 2d ed. 2006). This is possible, of course, precisely because the scope of the common
recognition is limited to E.U. member countries. The EC Regulations establish only three basic
prerequisites for enforcement: The judgment must be from the court of a member state, it must be
within the legal subject area of the regulation, and the original jurisdiction must have met the
regulation's jurisdictional rules. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86;
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86. Also, as noted above, the regulation on
uncontested money judgments focuses on minimum standards of notice and service rather than
jurisdiction. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supranote 86.
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The U.S. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act presents
a useful contrasting rule, one aimed at facilitating recognition of judgments
when the court has no prior assurance as to either the competence or
jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is before it. The U.S. rule also
creates a presumption in favor of recognition, but it is a much weaker one.
While the European procedure for enforcement allows submissions by the
defendant and consideration of the grounds for non-recognition only on appeal
to a designated court, U.S. courts consider these matters in the initial
proceeding. The U.S. rules give the court leeway to refuse to enforce the
judgment not only for all the reasons listed above, but also for fraud, a prior
agreement to settle out-of-court, if the original court was a "seriously
inconvenient forum" (in cases in which jurisdiction was based solely on
personal service), and significantly, if the original judicial system lacks due
process or impartial tribunals overall. 142 This latter proceeding is much more
burdensome, and the result much more uncertain, but the court at last gets an
assurance of the workings of the other system during the proceeding itself.
Neither model for recognition of foreign judgments could be applied
directly in Kosovo, for both depend on recognition of state authority for
recognition of a state court's judgments. But the grounds for non-enforcement
used in these models confirm the importance of UNMIK's concerns with
conflicting judgments, safeguarding defendants' right to participate, and
public policy. And the contrasts between the standards and procedures applied
when states have more or less certainty about the other state's court system
suggest the practical choices that UNMIK or a subsequent Kosovo
government could use to calibrate its scrutiny of the judgments: automatic
recognition and enforcement versus contested proceedings, the level of
specificity governing judicial decision-making, and the range of grounds for
non-enforcement.
2.

Contrast between ArbitrationAward and Out of Court
Settlement Models

The grounds for non-recognition of arbitration awards and out-of-court
settlements address additional concerns that are relevant to the Serbian
parallel courts. In both models, enforcing courts focus on the validity of the
original agreement between the parties. As discussed above, this represents
the fundamental legal ground for the legitimacy of the decision.
But the two categories contrast starkly in how they approach the
significance of the process provided in the initial proceeding. In the review of
arbitral awards, the fairness of the process used to reach the award is crucial,
both in terms of whether it comported with the parties' agreement and whether
it adhered to due process standards. But in recognizing out-of-court
settlements, process is irrelevant. Rather, out-of-court settlements could be
reached by virtually any means-a roll of the dice, a bet, or reasoned
negotiation-so long as neither party was coerced by fraud, duress, or
reasonable mistake. Here, the trade-off between efficiency and certainty on
142.

RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 4.
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the one hand, and confidence in the fairness of the process on the other, is at
its most absolute.
In assessing the applicability of these models to the cases described
above, both the employment case and the divorce case, the primary risk is of
conflicting judgments. There do not seem to have been allegations that the
Serbian parallel court proceedings themselves presented a risk of fraud, due
process violations, or conflicts with Kosovo's public policy. To the contrary,
it is the tension between the dual proceedings that presents these risks. In both
cases, it seems that the parties originally acquiesced to have their case heard in
the Serbian parallel courts and that, again, it is the violation of that agreement
by a party forum-shopping for a better result that presents a risk to the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
The categories on which there is broad consensus between the modelsagreement of the parties/jurisdiction, conflicting judgments, fraud, public
policy, and an opportunity for affected parties to participate-seem to present
ample safeguards for recognition of only those Serbian parallel court
judgments that are essentially fair and legitimate. If UNMIK were to adapt
one or more of these models, it could then calibrate its framework to the
desired balance between promoting legal certainty and assuring the legitimacy
of the judgments by making calculated decisions about the level of scrutiny to
be applied, the procedures to be used, and the extent of judicial discretion.
E.

A Civil Judgment Model

These mechanisms provide a robust set of models for Kosovo to draw
from in recognizing at least some civil Serbian parallel court cases. For the
parties in civil cases in Kosovo, the best approach may be to select particular
aspects from each of these models, as they are determined to be most
appropriate for Kosovo's unique circumstances. The arbitration award and
out-of-court settlement models provide a basis for using the agreement of the
parties, rather than the territorial jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts, as
the legal justification for recognition. The default rule favoring enforcement,
which is common to all the models, and the automatic initial recognition and
enforcement process of the E.C. Regulations would together present the most
immediately effective way of recognizing the entire category of civil
judgments at once, thereby introducing substantial certainty to the majority of
civil Serbian parallel cases. So long as the grounds for non-enforcement
appropriately safeguard other interests by permitting affected parties to object
on appeal based on conflicting judgments issued by UNMIK courts, a lack of
opportunity for parties or affected third parties to participate, and other
identified factors, this model would create substantial legal certainty with few
apparent downsides, and without requiring recognition of Serbian parallel
court jurisdiction per se. Particularly in the transitional justice context in
which substantial legal, political, and social uncertainties are inevitable,
promoting legal certainty and enabling ordinary people to go on with their
everyday lives is no small benefit.
Of course, particularly in the highly contentious context of negotiations
over Kosovo's political status, there is a risk that Serbia will treat any

2007]

ParallelCourts

recognition of parallel court judgments as recognition of territorial jurisdiction
and political sovereignty as well, regardless of UNMIK's legal rationale. Such
a risk, while real, is no greater than the ever-present risk that virtually any
action might be mischaracterized by politicians for political gain. More
importantly, recognizing the parallel judgments on one of these alternative
bases will not result in any change to the positions of the parties over
Kosovo's political status nor to the relative strength of their bargaining
positions. Irrespective of UNMIK's position on the matter, in the ongoing
negotiations over Kosovo's status, Serbia is claiming authority over Kosovo
and points to the parallel courts in the Serb enclaves as one indicator of its
ongoing role. Absent an open concession of Serbian sovereignty by UNMIK,
recognition of parallel court judgments is unlikely to be a salient factor in the
result.
Another position taken by Serbia is, however, highly relevant to this
discussion-Serbia's demands that, even if Kosovo were granted
independence, the parallel courts and administrative structures should not be
dismantled but rather should continue to be active in the enclaves to protect
the Serb minority's interests. 143 It is one thing to establish an entirely
retrospective system for recognizing past judgments, with the imperatives of
the parties' reliance on judgments already issued and executed, the desire to
promote social stability, and the reality that many of these judgments were
issued during a transitional period when UNMIK courts were either nonexistent or relatively inaccessible. If, however, during the political
negotiations over Kosovo's status the province accedes to Serbia's position on
this point, it will be necessary to craft a forward-looking practice of
recognition with a deliberate balance between the demands of certainty, and
fairness in light of the Serbian parallel courts' association with an enclaved
Serb minority. At this point, the normative imperative for creative decisionmaking based on the exigencies of the transitional period will fade away, and
Kosovo will find itself in a position much like that occupied by other societies
tolerating long-term situations of legal pluralism, driven by the everyday
concerns of accommodating ethnic and religious minorities.
A final concern that might be raised about general recognition of the
Serbian parallel courts' civil judgments is the risk of ratifying systemic interethnic discrimination within the court systems. To my surprise, while I
inquired repeatedly about any incidents of systemic inter-ethnic discrimination
in the Serbian parallel courts' civil and family judgments, none of those
interviewed for this Article (who included Kosovo Albanians, Serbians, and
members of the international community) claimed to know of any such cases,
and I found no official reports suggesting that such problems had arisen. This
is particularly striking since even dubious rumors of perceived discrimination
are typically the subject of widespread discussion. It is also remarkable
because, as will be discussed shortly, such concerns are not only present but
central in the property and criminal contexts.

Meeting,
143. UN Positive After Kosovo
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/4731142.stm.

BBC

NEWS.COM,

Feb.

21,

2006,
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While it is impossible to know how much confidence should be placed
in collective silence on the subject, in Kosovo's social context, it is plausible
that there could in fact be a difference in treatment of civil and family cases as
compared to property and criminal matters. Because Serbs and Albanians
have lived in discrete communities for some time now, there are far fewer
inter-ethnic families, businesses and other social and economic arrangements
than there once were, and thus there are likely more intra-Serb and fewer
inter-ethnic family, civil, and commercial cases in the Serbian parallel system
as well. In contrast, land seizures and violence have been an integral part of
the inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo, and so contentious cases concerning these
issues might be expected to carry on. In the same light, because land
ownership and inter-ethnic violence are highly charged issues in Kosovo, such
cases might be deliberately targeted by litigants or court officials in the
parallel system to serve political ends, and once within the system, they could
be more likely targets for discriminatory treatment in the courts, as they are in
the society as a whole. 144
If accusations of systemic unfairness or discrimination within the
Serbian parallel courts' civil process should develop, the specter of enforcing
systematically discriminatory decisions and the consequences of such a result
for confidence in the transition toward rule of law would force revisitation of
these conclusions. But at this point, without indicators of such problems, the
reports of injustice focus on the gaps in enforcement created by nonrecognition between the systems and militate toward recognition.
F.

An Exception for Property

One exception to this general approach in the civil judgments context is
disputes over title to land.' 5 Property transactions and claims are an area in
which the risk of inconsistent judgments and records is relatively high. The
war in 1999 created uncertainty about title to land on a range of levels. Most
importantly, there were several massive, unplanned movements of peoples in
a short time span, 146 and many of the cadastral records were taken, lost or
destroyed. 147 Since 1999, the parallel systems have been operating in tandem
to certify land sales, creating separate cadastral records for the same territory.
There seems to be a general consensus amongst those working on these issues
that the Serbian parallel cadastral offices have been offering only provisional
144. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 18-24.
145. There was general consensus among those with whom I spoke, and in particular amongst
those working on property issues, that this set of cases raised a different and far more complex set of
legal questions that were not commensurate with other civil cases and should be treated separately.
Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Katz Interview, supra note 78;
see also OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11.
146. Since the initial flight of the Albanian population south and then the reverse wave of Serbs
northward into Serbia proper, there has been additional consolidation of the Serb population into
enclaves and departures from the area, as well as movements of people from rural areas into the cities
and the invasion of the international community to occupy much of the downtown space in
Prigtina/Prishtind and other city centers. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Katz Interview, supra
note 78.
147. The Housing and Property Directorate is working to determine title as of 1999 and had
almost finished with the roughly 29,000 disputed claims on residential property as of May 2005.
Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31.
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certificates for land sales and other contracts and have not been recording
changes in land title, but this approach seems likely only to increase the
potential for confusion and conflicting claims of ownership. 148 And in at least
some cases, properties have been transferred within the Serbian parallel
systems, causing havoc when the property is brought into the UNMIK
system. 49
The question of post-conflict disputes over title to land is one that has
occurred in state after state around the world, and one that is too complex for
any general civil model to resolve, or for this paper to address in detail. 150 The
codes of most civil law states have some provision for resolving conflicting
land claims in ordinary times, and these might serve as an effective guideline
if it emerges that the number of conflicting claims are few and relatively
simple. 151If there are many claims and the legal analysis of title is
complicated by lack of documentation or other problems, then these models
may be inadequate to the task. The Housing and Property Directorate has
almost finished determining the title to residential properties as of 1999, and
this should create a baseline of legal certainty
that will simplify the work on
5
residential property disputes since that time.
One solution would be to require post-1999 re-registry of all land with
UNMIK offices, to employ a first-in-time default rule to incentivize
participation, and to litigate any competing claims in the regular courts under
standard rules of civil litigation. Irrespective of what approach it chooses,
however, Kosovo would do well to exempt property cases from any
overarching rule it constructs for recognition of other civil cases, and to turn
to the models used by other states for addressing post-conflict land claims to
construct a rule specifically for this issue. 53 Here, the balance between the
problem of legal uncertainty and the risk of fundamental unfairness in any
given decision tips in the other direction, requiring individual scrutiny of
property transactions.
IV.

CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS

Like the Serbian parallel civil cases, the Serbian parallel criminal
judgments present Kosovo's courts with a politically loaded version of a
commonplace legal problem: whether to treat a defendant's prior conviction
or acquittal as barring additional prosecutions for the same acts. As in the civil
cases, the non-recognition of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments also
presents troubling legal and social consequences ripe for some form of
intervention. But in the criminal context, much more so than in the civil
148.

Id.; OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.

149. For example, OSCE has reported that in one case, an owner was unable to complete the
sale of an apartment when an UNMIK court refused to verify the contract of sale because the previous
purchase contract had been verified by a Serbian parallel court. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT,
supra note 16, at 23.
150. See generally Jon D. Unruh, Land and PropertyRights in the Peace Process(Jan. 2004),

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essayLand tenure/?nid=1387; Lewis, supra note 79.
151.
152.
153.

E.g., C. clv. arts. 1264-65 (Fr.).
Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 3 1; Katz Interview, supra note 145.
See Unruh, supra note 150; Lewis, supra note 79, at 6.
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context, the social and legal incentives for recognizing the Serbian parallel
courts' judgments are parried by competing interests that weigh against
recognition.
Judgments relating to criminal law touch on one of the hot-button issues
of the Serbian-Albanian conflict, inter-ethnic violence, and on one of the core
substantive concerns of post-conflict justice, assigning legal responsibility for
past atrocities. Thus, the transitional justice concerns raised by the criminal
cases are far more concrete and immediate than in the civil context, relating to
the substance of the claims before the court; the fairness of the procedures
used to decide them; and the satisfaction of Kosovo society with the capacity
of the courts to address these controversial issues, which in the recent past
were settled through force.
To the extent that Serbian parallel civil proceedings can be relied upon
as essentially fair and non-discriminatory, it is the lack of certainty in the
enforceability of judgments between the systems and the resulting conflicting
judgments and arbitrage that have caused injustices. In civil cases, unless and
until reports of systematic injustice arise, the balance between scrutinizing
judgments to assure fairness and efficiently recognizing judgments to assure
legal certainty clearly tips in favor of legal certainty. Recognition of the
Serbian parallel civil judgments serves as an appropriate and effective
mechanism for resolving these injustices.
But in the criminal setting, in addition to the problems raised by mutual
non-recognition and conflicting judgments, there are reports of ethnic
discrimination and sham proceedings within the Serbian parallel system. Such
concerns cannot be resolved by, and would in fact be exacerbated by,
recognition of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments. In such a context, the
proper balance between these competing values is more difficult to
ascertain. 154 The first part of this section reviews two case studies that
illustrate these concerns.
In Section IV.B, I consider a further complication presented in the
criminal setting: here, the balance between conflicting judgments and fairness
is not entirely a matter of discretion, for it implicates international human
rights norms, including double jeopardy and other defendants' rights, as well
as the rights of victims and the public to see criminal justice done. Therefore,
the first question that must be asked in the criminal context is not, as it is in
the civil context, may the Serbian parallel judgments be recognized? Rather, it
is must the Serbian parallel judgments be recognized or rejected-that is, do
the human rights of the defendants or the victims compel either universal
recognition or universal rejection of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments?
Here, human rights norms compel the rejection of some, but not all, Serbian
parallel criminal judgments.
Section IV.C considers the legal models and justifications available for
recognizing those Serbian parallel criminal judgments whose fate is not
determined by human rights norms. In the criminal context, the available
154. It is worth noting, of course, that if this were ultimately found not to be the case-that is,
if the Serbian parallel system were demonstrated to be systematically unfair in civil cases-the balance
of interests would shift for the civil cases to be closer to that in the criminal cases.
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models are far more limited in number and scope than in the civil context.
Here, there is not a common practice of recognizing non-state judgments like
the general recognition of arbitration awards and out-of-court settlement
agreements that provided both a model and a rationale (consent) for
recognizing the civil Serbian parallel judgments. Indeed, such recognition is
typically impermissible. Even within the limited context of criminal
judgments by the courts of sovereign foreign states, there is not broad
international consensus favoring recognition of such judgments, nor is there
agreement on the default rules. Rather, such recognition is rare, existing
primarily in the context of efforts to create a common legal system, and the
default rules and exceptions for such recognition vary tremendously. The rules
for recognition are also less well elaborated than in the civil context,
depending instead more on exercise of discretion and comity than on codified
factors.
These limited legal models will not permit Kosovo to bypass the
political problem of sovereignty, nor can they adequately address the tension
between resolving the problems posed by conflicting judgments and the
problems posed by essential fairness concerns. Accordingly, I conclude that,
in spite of the resultant loss of legal certainty and the human cost to
defendants, Kosovo should address its Serbian parallel criminal judgments on
a case-by-case basis, and through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
rather than formal recognition. Kosovo's provisional criminal procedure and
criminal codes provide mechanisms that can facilitate such case-by-case
analysis, and these are discussed in Section IV.D.
A.

Two Criminal Cases

As in the civil context, neither the Serbian parallel courts nor the
UNMIK courts recognize each other's criminal judgments. Rather, if faced
with a defendant who has already been tried by the other tribunal, both courts
will pursue their own prosecutions without regard to the determinations of the
other system. The one concession frequently made by UNMIK courts is to
give credit in sentencing a convicted defendant for time served in the Serbian
parallel system, whether in pre-trial detention or after sentencing, but this is
not a formal policy, merely a common practice.' 55
56
Two cases present paradigmatic examples of the interests at stake.
Judge Baruti, the President of the District Court of Mitrovicd/Mitrovica (an
UNMIK court), described a case that illustrates the cost the parallel systems
impose on defendants. A Serb defendant was suspected of a murder in
155. Baruti Interview, supra note 31.
156. As in the civil context, see supra note 90 and accompanying text, official reports on the
parallel courts also describe criminal cases raising these issues. E.g., OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES
REPORT, supra note 16, at 20 (describing two cases in which defendants were tried for the same acts in
both UNMIK and Serbian parallel courts). The OSCE also reported that the presidents of two Serbian
parallel courts informed it that they had caseloads of hundreds of criminal cases between 1999 and July
2003. Id. at 19-20. However, once again, due to the mutual non-recognition between the systems that
has produced the problems discussed in this article, neither official judgments and other individual case
records nor statistical or other general data are available for the Serbian parallel courts criminal cases, so
that it is not possible to ascertain the number or nature of the overlapping and/or conflicting cases.
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Mitrovicd/Mitrovica. He traveled into Serbia proper, where he was arrested by
the Serbian police and brought before the Serbian parallel district court for
Mitrovicd/Mitrovica, which is located in the Serbian city of Kraljevo. He was
detained there, tried, and acquitted. Thinking that double jeopardy would
prevent his retrial in Kosovo, the defendant returned to Mitrovica/Mitrovica,
where a warrant for his arrest was pending. He was promptly arrested, held
again in custody, tried, and acquitted again, whereupon he57filed a claim for
compensation from UNMIK for the period of his detention.
Here, what Judge Baruti described as the "human cost" of the
defendant's dual detentions is obvious. But in Kosovo, these multiple
prosecutions are understood to affect not only this human cost, but also the
defendant's legal right to be free from double jeopardy. To American readers
accustomed to the dual sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy principle
and to the possibility of multiple prosecutions in state and federal courts that
this exception permits, this may not seem like a legitimate concern. Here, it is
important to note that some European states do not recognize the dual
sovereignty principle, but rather, regard a prosecution in any recognized court
as barring further prosecutions for the same acts in any other recognized court
on the basis of the principle of ne bis in idem, a principle that is similar but not
identical to the American concept of double jeopardy. Also, in the United
States the otherwise stark dual sovereignty rule is substantially mitigated by
the principle of comity so that repeated prosecutions are in fact rare; such an
approach of course
cannot be expected between the Serbian parallel and
58
UNMIK courts.1
But there are other concerns as well, and these are illustrated by a
second case. A Kosovo Serb was accused of shooting an unarmed, elderly
Kosovo Albanian man who had been merely standing silently as the defendant
passed by. The defendant's act was spurred, it was reported, by the sudden
fear that the Albanian man would seize his gun. The UNMIK Prosecutor
issued an indictment for murder, but the defendant fled to Serbia proper,
where he was arrested, tried for murder by a Serbian parallel court, and
157. Baruti Interview, supra note 31. The OSCE describes what may be the same case, and is
at a minimum a case with very similar facts, in a 2002 report. OSCE NtNTH MINoRITY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 36, at 17. Kosovo's Criminal Procedure Code provides a cause of action for damages for
unjustified convictions and deprivations of liberty. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Provisional Criminal
ProcedureCode of Kosovo, arts. 534, 538, U.N. Doc. UNMI/REG/2003/26 (July 6, 2003), availableat
http://www.unmikonlin.org/regulations/2003/KE2003-26.pdf
[hereinafter
Provisional Criminal
Procedure Code of Kosovo). Reversals of this scenario also occur, with a Serbian parallel court trial
following a prior UNMIK conviction or acquittal. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note
16, at 20.
158. See infra Subsection IV.C. 1. Generalizing broadly, in the American view, the touchstone
of double jeopardy is whether the legal grounds for prosecution are different, and multiple prosecutions
for the same act are readily tolerated, so long as the charges brought do not encompass the prior charges.
In the European view, the core ne bis in idem protection is against multiple prosecutions for the same
act, regardless of how the act is charged. In addition, U.S. courts apply the dual sovereignty principle to
permit second trials even on the same legal grounds so long as the trial takes place under a different
sovereign. In Europe, some states apply ne bis in idem across international borders, whereas many,
while recognizing the sweeping nature of the principle, view it as the basis for negotiating bilateral
agreements not to reprosecute and do not apply it automatically in the absence of such agreements. Dax
Eric Lopez, Note, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent
Non Bis in Idem, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1263, 1271-73, 1282-84 f2000); see also infra Section

IV.B.
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convicted. But the sentence he received for his crime was a single year in
prison, a sentence so light as to raise concern about the good faith
of the
59
proceedings. The indictment in Kosovo has never been carried out.'
Serbian parallel cases involving accusations of war crimes or interethnic violence present a particularly acute dilemma for UNMIK, for such
cases both illustrate and catalyze the continuing ethnic tensions and security
problems in the province.1 60 As suggested by this second example, the trial
and sentencing practices of the Serbian parallel courts have raised suspicions
of partiality and sham prosecutions intended to shield defendants rather than
to assess their guilt or innocence. Therefore, in addition to the rights of
defendants, criminal trials in Serbian parallel courts implicate the interests of
both the public and victims in justice and social stability.
B.

InternationalHuman Rights Norms

In Kosovo today, international human rights norms have been imported
into the national legal structure by the Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government, which provides that eight international human
rights treaties are directly applicable in Kosovo, including two of relevance
here: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols ("European Convention") and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols
("ICCPR"). 161 Kosovo's Provisional
Criminal Procedure Code also directly
62
protects certain human rights.
Parallel criminal prosecutions
implicate two well-established
defendants' rights. On the one hand, the right to be free from double jeopardy
or ne bis in idem (which corresponds roughly to the interest in avoiding
conflicting judgments and assuring legal certainty described in the civil
context)" might require that UNMIK refrain from trying defendants who
have already faced prosecution in the parallel courts, or that it object
strenuously to retrial in the parallel courts of defendants it has already
prosecuted. On the other hand, the right to trial before an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law (corresponding in turn to the fairness
value discussed above) might require UNMIK to reject the parallel court
judgments out of hand.
Of these two rights, Kosovo's international institutions have analyzed
the problem of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments almost exclusively as a
159. First Interview with Anonymous #11, supra note 93.
160. A number of defendants who have been indicted by UNMIK on serious charges ranging
from attempted murder to genocide have reportedly fled to Serbia proper. Id.
161. See Constitutional Framework, supra note 41, arts. 3.2, 9; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 9, 14, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
162. Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157. Before 2003, the
applicable criminal procedure code in Kosovo was that of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
163. "The principle of finality of criminal proceedings also underlies the principle of ne bis in
idem." Case C-467/04, Gasparini and Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295, para. 72 n.57 (June 15,
2006).

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32: 1

problem of double jeopardy. 164 In so doing, they seem to assume that the
principle necessarily applies to duplicate prosecutions by UNMIK and Serbian
parallel courts. 165 But in fact, ne bis in idem does not bar these prosecutions.
On a theoretical level, the principle of ne bis in idem should ideally be applied
to multiple prosecutions for the same act regardless of the courts or charges
involved. But in reality, the international legal obligation is more limited. As
defined by the relevant human rights treaties, ne bis in idem applies only to
multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign. The European Convention, for
example, refers to the right not to be tried again "under the jurisdiction of the
same State, ' 66 while the International Covenant on Civil and'1 67Political Rights
forbids re-prosecution after final judgment in "each country."
Within Kosovo, the language of the Provisional Criminal Procedure
Code is ambiguous on the question of whether ne bis in idem applies only to
cases tried in the recognized Kosovo courts or to cases tried in foreign courts
as well.168 However, the Provisional Criminal Code permits retrial in Kosovo
after foreign prosecutions in some instances, indicating that ne bis in idem
169
protection may not be considered to apply to those judgments.
Furthermore, even if the principle of ne bis in idem were applicable, this
would not prevent Kosovo from trying defendants whom it believed had been
subject to sham or biased prosecutions in the Serbian parallel system. There
are well-established exceptions in international human rights law to permit
either reopening of a case (in the traditional context of multiple prosecutions
within a state) or the instigation of a new case in a different state (in the
context of extension of the principle to prosecutions by multiple sovereigns)
for lack of due process, or in the case of sham
for new evidence,
0
proceedings. 17
164. See OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 20; OSCE TENTH MINORITY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 33.

165. See OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5, 20.
166. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161, Protocol No. 7, 4(1).
167. ICCPR, supra note 161, art. 14(7).
168. Kosovo's Criminal Procedure Code forbids re-prosecution if a defendant "has been
acquitted or convicted of a criminal offense by a final decision of a court, if criminal proceedings
against him or her were terminated by a final decision of a court or if the indictment against him or her
was dismissed by a final decision of a court." Provisional CriminalProcedureCode of Kosovo, supra
note 157, art. 4(1) (emphasis added). The code does not define whether the term "court" refers solely to
the courts of Kosovo or also to foreign courts. It does use the terms "a court," "the courts," and "courts"
throughout when plainly referring solely the enumerated courts of Kosovo and not to foreign courts or
other tribunals. Adding to the ambiguity, Article 4's reference to "a court" is surrounded by variations
on the phrase, seemingly without any meaningful difference: All appear to refer solely to the Kosovo
courts. See, e.g., id. art. 1 ("the regular courts"), art. 2 ("a court"), art. 3 ("the court"), art. 5 ("the
court"). The criminal procedure code of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, which was effective in
Kosovo previously, is similarly non-specific, reading in relevant part: "if the defendant has already been
effectively convicted of the same criminal act or acquitted of the charge .... " CRIM. P.C. art. 349(5)
(Yugo.) (on file with author).
169. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, arts. 99-104, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2003/25 (July 6, 2003), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2003/
RE2003-25.pdf [hereinafter CriminalCode of Kosovo].
170. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161, Protocol No. 7, art. 4(2);
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 20(3), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/9
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 13: Equality Before
the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Establishedby Law, art.
14,
19 (1984), reprinted in International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 14, U.N. Doe.
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From UNMIK's perspective, what ought to be of more concern is the
international human rights protection of trial before a properly constituted
tribunal. The European Convention requires that a person be detained only
upon conviction or order of a "competent court," and that a defendant has the
right to be "brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law
71
to exercise judicial power" to determine the lawfulness of his detention.,
The defendant is then entitled to trial "by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law."' 72 The requirements of the ICCPR73and Kosovo's
Provisional Criminal Procedure Code are essentially the same.'
Under these standards, there are two aspects of this right that are at issue
in Serbian parallel cases like those discussed above: whether the tribunal is
independent and impartial, and whether the defendant is tried before a
competent court with legal authority to hear the case. As to the first question,
as illustrated by the cases described above, there is some reason to doubt the
independence and impartiality of the Serbian courts, at least in inter-ethnic
cases. Such concerns are generally grounded in the region's history of interethnic discrimination and violence-the very reason
74 that the Security Council
1
itself.
province
the
governing
from
Serbia
barred
In relation to this question, it is also important to note that removing all
criminal cases to the UNMIK system would not guarantee an impartial
tribunal, at least not under the present operating conditions in the UNMIK
courts. Indeed, several members of the legal community reported that UNMIK
judges are under enormous pressure to convict Serb defendants accused of
crimes against Albanians and that this pressure has taken the form not merely
of social approval or disapproval but of threats of violence. 175 It has also been
suggested that there is considerable pressure within the Albanian community
to testify against Serbs accused of war crimes and inter-ethnic violence
irrespective of the witness's actual knowledge of the matter, rendering witness
testimony highly problematic as a form of evidence.' 76 In counterpoint, the
international judges and prosecutors are perceived by the Albanian

HRI\GEN\ Il\Rev.1 (July 24, 1994); Legislative Resolution 7246/2003, Application of the "Ne Bis in
Idem" Principle, amend. 13, art. 2, para. 2, 2004 O.J. (C 76) 86, 91 (Eur. Parl.), available at

http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/ceO76/ceO7620040325enOO860094.pdf
[hereinafter European Parliament Legislative Resolution]. There are also other exceptions under which
the trial is not considered to have resulted in final judgment, such as retrials following successful
appeals and, in the American system, mistrials or retrials on substantively different charges. See Albin
Eser, For UniversalJurisdiction, 39 TULSA L. REV. 955, 967-68 (2004).
171. European Convention, supra note 161, art. 5.
172. Id. art. 6.
173. Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, arts. 2, 20; ICCPR,
supra note 161, art. 9(3).
174. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; see also discussion, supra Section I.A. Recognition of
the Serbian parallel court judgments could also violate other defendants' rights-for example, the
presumption of innocence. Under Kosovo's Provisional Criminal Procedure Code and the applicable
human rights treaties, as in most criminal justice systems, "[a]ny person ... charged with a criminal
offense shall be deemed innocent until his or her guilt has been established by a final judgment of the
court." Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 3(1); ICCPR, supra note 161;
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161. However, this concern is subject to the same
limitations as the other rights discussed above.
175. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31.
176. Pantovic Interview, supranote 31.
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community as bending over backwards to accommodate Serbs and other
minorities in the name of ethnic harmony and minority rights.' 77
As for the second question, of course, which legal system is authorized
and which law governs in Kosovo are precisely the political issues at stake.
But setting aside the ultimate determination of this question, according to
UNMIK's own understanding of the governing law, one must conclude that
the rights of defendants under UNMIK's jurisdiction to be tried in a
competent tribunal established 78by law are violated by trial in the unauthorized
Serbian parallel court system.1
This conclusion foreshadows the fidings in the next Section: that in the
criminal context, sovereignty-or at least authority delegated by a
sovereign-is the sole source of legitimacy, and it is impossible to circumvent
the sovereignty question as can be done in the civil context. However, it is
also important to note that while defendants' rights may have been violated by
trial in the Serbian parallel court system, and while this may serve as at least
formal grounds for non-recognition of such judgments, such a result could not
be characterized as a remedy for the violation. After all, these standards are
79
intended to protect defendants by limiting state power to detain and punish.1
International human rights norms might require Kosovo to respond to a
defendant's objection to Serbian parallel court jurisdiction on these grounds,
to refuse to participate in a prosecution in the parallel courts, to seek
compensation for a defendant wrongfully tried, and even to refuse to
recognize a criminal judgment, but subsequent retrial of a defendant would
have to be justified on some other grounds than protection of the defendants'
rights.
C.

Frameworksfor Recognition and Non-Recognition

The relevant models for recognition and enforcement of foreign criminal
judgments to bar domestic prosecution include: the Schengen acquis, which
contains an agreement applicable to certain European Union member states to
extend the principle of ne bis in idem between them;' 80 a proposed E.U.
Council Framework Decision to the same effect;' 81 and the U.S. common law
177. Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.
178. Security Council Resolution 1244 authorizes the international community to set up
temporary administration leading to self-government for Kosovo. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 2,
1011. The Constitutional Framework for Kosovo establishes a judiciary with sole jurisdiction over the
province that does not provide any basis for Serbian parallel court jurisdiction. Constitutional
Framework, supra note 41, art. 9.4. The Serbian parallel courts apply laws and follow procedures that
are no longer the laws and procedures in force in Kosovo. ProvisionalCriminal Code of Kosovo, supra
note 168, art. 2. Of course, one would expect Serbia to draw the same conclusion concerning the
UNMIK courts.
179. This is, of course, the "main rationale" of the ne bis in idem principle as well. Case C467/04, Gasparini and Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295, para. 72 n.57 (June 15, 2006).
180. The Schengen acquis comprises the Agreement between the Governments of the States of
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed at Schengen on 14 June 1985, and the
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement. Convention Implementing the Schengen
Agreement of 14 June 1985, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement Convention]. See
Gasparini,paras. 4-5.
181. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170.

ParallelCourts

2007]

rule, which represents the usual default rule to treat foreign criminal
judgments as having no effect on additional domestic prosecutions on the
same grounds.' In contrast to the civil law context, where Kosovo relies on
the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia law, Kosovo has a new
Provisional Criminal Code and Provisional Criminal Procedure Code as of
2003.183 Here, the available legal models do not provide a basis for a
sweeping decision implicating all Serbian parallel court judgments, but rather
leave Kosovo with no better option than a case-by-case approach.
1.

Sovereignty

In the criminal context, the available legal models do not present a
means of bypassing the issue of sovereignty, as they do in the civil context. To
the contrary, recognition of criminal judgments is predicated on an exercise of
state authority, and consent plays no role in most cases. The U.S. case law 1on
84
point refers consistently to "sovereigns" and "sovereign governments."
Kosovo's Provisional Criminal Code permits recognition only of the criminal
judgments of foreign states' courts, while the Schengen acquis and the
proposed E.C. Framework Decision further limit recognition to contracting or
member states respectively. 185 While Kosovo's Provisional Criminal
Procedure Code permits private prosecutions and minor cases to be mediated,
the public prosecutor, and thus ultimately the state, must acquiesce in the
decision to mediate the case and approve the mediator, unlike
the civil context
86
in which the parties can take the case to mediation at will.
2.

Default Rules and Groundsfor Non-Recognition

In the criminal context, as in the civil context, most states employ a
default rule against recognition of other jurisdictions' criminal judgments,
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concerning
successive foreign-federal prosecutions: "The [double jeopardy] clause forecloses multiple prosecutions
for the same offense by the same sovereign, but not ones by different sovereigns"); United States v.
Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (concerning successive foreign-federal prosecutions: "The
black-letter rule is that prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereign governments, no matter how
similar they may be in character, do not raise the specter of double jeopardy"); Chua Han Mow v.
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (concerning
successive foreign-federal prosecutions: "'prosecution by a foreign sovereign does not preclude the
United States from bringing criminal charges' (quoting United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 46 (9th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam))), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979)); see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377, 382-85 (1922) (applying the dual sovereignty rule to successive state-federal prosecutions).
183. Provisional Criminal Code, supra note 169, arts. 99-103; see also Provisional Criminal
Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, arts. 509-11.
184. See, e.g., Rashed, 234 F.3d at 1282 ("different sovereigns"); Guzman, 85 F.3d at 826
("sovereign governments"); Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1313 ("a foreign sovereign"); Lanza, 260 U.S.
at 382 ("two sovereignties").
185. The Kosovo Provisional Criminal Code refers alternately to "another jurisdiction," "a
foreign jurisdiction," and "a foreign court." Provisional Criminal Code, supra note 1698, arts. 103-04;
see also Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 6, art. 509(1); Schengen
Agreement Convention, supranote 178, art. 54; European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note
170.
186. The prosecutor must take into account the nature of the crime, the circumstances, and the
defendant's criminal record and level of culpability. ProvisionalCriminalProcedure Code of Kosovo,
supra note 156, arts. 54(3), 228.
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unless there is an agreement or law to the contrary. Specifically, without an
agreement on the subject, most states do not view criminal prosecutions by
one state as barring an additional prosecution on the same facts by a second
state with jurisdiction over the matter. As discussed above, international
human rights law does not require that they do so. Rather, without some
agreement in place, states typically refrain from such prosecutions solely as a
matter of comity, and most do not regard the foreign prosecution as presenting
a legal barrier.187
But unlike the civil context, where agreements and laws to facilitate the
recognition and enforcement of judgments are proliferating, there are still few
agreements and laws recognizing and enforcing criminal judgments against
the possibility of future prosecutions.' 88 In Europe, the Schengen acquis, as
integrated into the E.U. framework, provides for automatic recognition of
criminal judgments of the courts of its member states and prohibits retrials on
the same facts amongst thirteen of the E.U. member states. 189 The European
Union is now moving toward a similar E.U.-wide model as part of its efforts
to create a single regional jurisdiction in Europe, but efforts at harmonization
and developing common E.U. mechanisms have been contested and
controversial. 190 Moreover, there do not exist in the criminal context the
widely ratified agreements that govern enforcement in the context of civil and
commercial judgments and represent collective international agreement on the
importance and mechanism of recognizing such judgments. In the criminal
187. Some states, such as Germany, do give credit for time served at sentencing, applying a
"deduction principle." There are also a few states like the Netherlands that automatically recognize most
foreign criminal judgments, applying the broadest understanding of the ne bis in idem principle. Eser,
supra note 170, at 964. It is also important to note that within the United States, in the context of
successive federal-state prosecutions, comity is really more the rule than the exception. The federal
government has adopted internal guidelines known as the "Petite Policy" disfavoring federal
prosecutions following a U.S. state prosecution "unless reasons are compelling." ADAM HARRIS
CURLAND, SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 3 (2001). While policies amongst the U.S. states vary,

a number of states also frequently refrain from reprosecuting following a sister state's judgment, often
under the auspices of a state statute. Id. at 45-46.
188. Rather, most agreements and laws recognizing foreign criminal judgments are for the
limited purposes of extradition, cooperation, or designation of a foreign national as having a criminal
record. E.g., CODE PENALE art. 768 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/
cpptextA.htm. Such provisions do not bar states from prosecuting a defendant altogether, even if he has
already been charged and prosecuted for the same crime in another state, so long as the defendant enters
the court's jurisdiction without the need for extradition. E.g., Extradition Treaty Between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States, U.S.-Mex., art. 6, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5061
(barring extradition). Within the United States, Mississippi is unusual in having enacted a statute of
general applicability barring state prosecution after a foreign "conviction or acquittal for the same
offense." MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); CURLAND, supra note 188, at 185.
189. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170, amend. 2, recital 2a (new);
Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 180, art. 54. See also Case C-467/04, Gasparini and
Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295 (June 15, 2006); Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gzuitok,
Brogge, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1345, 2003 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 386 (Feb. 11, 2003); Case C-469/03, Miraglia,
2005 E.C.R. 1-2009, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 80 (Mar. 10, 2005); Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, 2006
E.C.R. 1-2333, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 576 (Mar. 9, 2006); Case C-150/05, Van Straaten, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 541 (Sept. 28, 2006).
190. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170. Case C-303/05,
1-8 (Sept. 12,
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 2006 WL 2612698,
2006) (concerning "a far-reaching debate concerning the risk of incompatibility between the
constitutions of the Member States and European Union law" over the new European arrest warrant,
raised in the constitutional courts in Belgium, Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, as well as the
Supreme Court of Cyprus).
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context, there is considerably less convergence than in the civil context, and
the models that exist are far less robust.
Table 4: Default Recognition Rules and Grounds for Non-Enforcement
Schengen acquis
Default Rule

Contracting Party states
must refrain from
prosecuting a defendant
for the same acts after
final disposition in
another Contracting
Party' 91

Proposed E.C.
Framework Decision
Member States must
refrain from prosecuting
adefendant for the same
acts, facts or behavior
after a final criminal
judgment in other
member states' 92

Grounds for
nonenforcement of
the foreign
criminal
judgment

1.If convicted, failure
to enforce a penalty
2. State party's prior
declaration of certain
exceptions concerning
its:

1. If convicted, failure
to enforce a penalty
2. Post-judgment proof
of new facts not
reasonably discoverable
by prosecutors at time

a.exclusive territorial

of trial

act' 8

jurisdiction
b. national
security/other essential
interests
c.official acts of state

3. Fundamental
procedural error under
original state's law
4. Violation of
defendant's rights 96

3.Any case can be reopened
to benefit a def. on the same
basis or:
a. Favorable new evidence
b.Def. was tried repeatedly

95

officials'

U.S. Common
Law
Dual sovereignty
doctrine: foreign
judgments do not
bar prosecutions
in U.S. courts 93

N/A

Kosovo Provisional
Criminal Code
Depends on the basis for
Kosovo's juris.
1.If territorial: foreign
judgments do not bar
prosecutions in K. courts
2. If another basis: K. must
refrain from prosecuting a
def. following final foreign
judgment & serving the
foreign punishment' 9
1.If territorial juris.: Public
Prosecutor's discretion197
2.Any ease can be reopened
against adef. for fraudulent
evidence or a
judge/investigator's criminal
9

c. Multiple people were

convicted of an act only one
or some could have
committed"'S

Whereas in the civil context, a generous default rule is moderated by
carefully crafted grounds for non-enforcement whose substance and procedure
is calibrated to the level of confidence in and concern with the fairness of the
alternative tribunal's process, in the criminal context, there is a sharp
divergence between the Schengen and proposed European Union default rules
favoring recognition and the U.S. common law rule disfavoring recognition.
There is also little convergence in or certainty concerning the appropriate
grounds for non-enforcement. Rather than centering the non-enforcement
191. Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 178, art. 54.
192. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 168, amend. 12, art. 2, para. 1.
193. United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Guzman,
85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984);
see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382-85 (1922).
194. Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 169, arts. 103-04 (also listing additional minor
grounds); see also Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 511 (enforcing foreign
criminal judgments when Kosovo lacks jurisdiction).
195. Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 176, at 55.
196. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 166, amend. 7, recital 7(b) &
amend. 12, art. 2, para. 1.
197. Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 169, arts. 103(1), 103(5); Provisional
Criminal Procedural Code ofKosovo, supra note 157, art. 511.
198. This rule applies to reopening both domestic and foreign judgments. The fraud or crime
must be proved by a final judgment or, in special circumstances, by other evidence. Id. art. 442.
199. This rule also applies to both domestic and foreign judgments. Id.
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decision in a set of legal factors that can be considered after a request to
enforce is presented, instead, states that do not choose to enforce foreign legal
decisions tend to make that choice as a matter of discretion or comity at the
outset. Furthermore, none of the grounds recognized in other states would
permit Kosovo to grapple with its core concern: the risk of procedurally
correct but nonetheless substantively sham proceedings. 200 Indeed, the
standards established for recognition in the European examples "presuppose[]
confidence in the fact that judgments recognised are always delivered 20in1
accordance with the principles of legality, subsidiarity and proportionality."
Kosovo itself straddles the different models. The underlying rationale
for its contrasting default rules appears to be a judgment that it is important
for Kosovo to prosecute crimes committed within its own borders. This
principle, of course, precludes recognition of the Serbian parallel court
judgments. If Kosovo were nonetheless to adopt a default rule accepting
Serbian parallel court criminal judgments, its provisions on reopening cases
would provide some rationale for reopening cases involving fraud or criminal
misbehavior within the proceedings. However, this provision sets a high
evidentiary standard for reopening cases, requiring a final judgment of fraud
or crime in most cases. As a result, this might not be sufficient to permit
reopening of cases like the one described in Section IV.A above, in which an
extremely light sentence gives rise to suspicions of discrimination and sham
but in which there is not necessarily evidence of such conduct
proceedings,
2 °2
available.
Furthermore, while in the civil context the consent of the parties
provided some rationale for tolerating differences in process and result from
what might have existed if the case had been brought before the UNMIK
courts, there is no principle that can do similar work here. The civil models
also provided for consideration of a more generous set of concerns in at least
some instances. Because they will not permit Kosovo to recognize the
criminal judgments without acknowledging sovereignty, and because they do
not provide factors effective for grappling with the core concern about the
Serbian parallel courts' exercise of authority over criminal cases, these models
do not provide a template for establishing a default rule favoring general
recognition of Serbian parallel criminal judgments.

200. The International Criminal Court rules on complementarity do permit the ICC to prosecute
if a domestic proceeding was a sham, but do not provide rules or factors for determining this. See Rome
Statute, supra note 166, art. 20(3).
201. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 166, amend. 4, recital 5
(superseded by amendment) (emphasis omitted); see also Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gfztitok,
Brtigge, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1345, 133, 2003 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 386 (Feb. 11, 2003) (when the ne bis in
idem principle is applied, "there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in
their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied").
202. Compare ProvisionalCriminal Code ofKosovo, supra note 168, arts. 99-104 (establishing
criminal jurisdiction of Kosovo courts, conditions for prosecution where criminal proceedings have been
initiated in another jurisdiction, and calculation of detention and punishment served in other
jurisdictions), with Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 442
(enumerating conditions under which a final criminal judgment can be reopened).
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3.

A CriminalJudgment Model: Case by Case Assessments

Finally, in the criminal context, not only are the legal models for
recognition of judgments limited and linked to sovereignty, the transitional
justice imperatives that push for recognition of judgments in the civil context
cut in the opposite direction. Because some criminal judgments-particularly
those relating to inter-ethnic violence-are so closely linked in the public
view to the core of the conflict itself, the public perception that the judicial
system can and will punish violence, and particularly inter-ethnic violence, is
crucial to the future stability and security of Kosovo. 20 3 The very reason for
U.N. intervention in Kosovo was the ethnic bias that pervaded the government
and social institutions and that ultimately culminated in violent ethnic
cleansing. Likewise, the purpose of continued U.N. involvement is the
establishment of a democratic, multi-ethnic government capable of ensuring
security and justice.204 In recent months, as negotiations over Kosovo's
and other attacks, both inter-ethnic and
political status have begun, bombings
2 5
intra-Albanian, have been frequent. 0
Furthermore, under the law applicable in Kosovo today, prosecutors
may have an obligation to bring charges in at least some of the cases already
tried by the Serbian parallel courts, particularly if they have reason to believe
the proceedings in the parallel case may have been discriminatory. The
relevant human rights treaties guarantee rights to protection against intrusions
on life, liberty, and other attack; to equality before the law; and to
nondiscrimination. 20 6 Indeed, Kosovo's Provisional Criminal Procedure Code
specifically requires the prosecutor to prosecute where there are reasonable
grounds to think that a crime has been committed. Her discretion to choose
20 7
not to prosecute or to divert a case to mediation is limited to minor crimes.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a crime
victim's right of access to justice to require states to prosecute crimes that rise
to the level of violating the victim's human rights, such as the right to life.20 8
Of course, not all cases tried in the Serbian parallel courts will implicate
these concerns. Many crimes are minor or intra-ethnic in nature. Particularly
in cases involving members of the same ethnic community and tried in the
Serbian parallel courts within Kosovo, victims may well have had the
203.
204.

But see Brooks, supra note 13.
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN Kosovo, Kosovo STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2

205.

UNHCR Condemns Violence Targeting Kosovar Serb Returnees, REUTERS FOUNDATION

(2004).

ALERTNET,

Sept.

22,

2006,

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/

fi 1107eb68de824055dlc838ce6d1833.htm; Nidhi Sharma, Kosovo Interior Minister's Car Bombed,
ALL HEADLINE NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7004870174; Grenade
Hits Serb Caf in Kosovo, BBC NEWS.COM, Aug. 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/

5290022.stm.
206. ICCPR, supra note 161, arts. 1, 9, 14, 17, 26; European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 161, arts. 2, 5, 14.
207. ProvisionalCriminalProcedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 6.
208. Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth and Justice
for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1419-23 (2002). The E.U. goes further,
as expressed in a 2001 Council Framework Decision guaranteeing victims' rights to participate in
criminal proceedings as well as rights to compensation and protection. Council Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA, Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, 2001 O.J. (L 82) 1-4.
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opportunity to participate in the proceedings. As far as ethnic discrimination is
concerned, not even all inter-ethnic cases will raise discrimination concerns,
and it is unlikely that many of the Serbian parallel courts' criminal cases are
inter-ethnic, in light of the small number of non-Albanians remaining in
Kosovo and the limited interactions between the ethnic communities.
However, although at least some of the Serbian parallel criminal
judgments present appealing cases for recognition, the available legal models
and justifications do not provide a mechanism for general recognition of the
criminal judgments as they do in the civil context. In the criminal context,
there is no legal framework that permits circumvention of sovereignty. The
transitional justice values of ensuring criminal justice, consolidating
sovereignty, and establishing security are all so strongly implicated by control
over the criminal process that they must trump the interests in efficiency and
legal certainty that prevail in the civil context. To protect these rights and
interests, Kosovo must either undertake a case-by-case analysis to cull those
cases that raise human rights concerns from those that do not, or refuse to
recognize the Serbian parallel criminal judgments altogether, thereby rejecting
some judgments that do not raise human rights concerns along with those that
do.
However, just as recognizing civil judgments generally does not mean
ceding all discretion to deny recognition in cases where there are grounds for
such a decision, so also refusing to recognize Serbian parallel criminal
judgments in general does not mean that every case heard in the Serbian
parallel courts must be retried. First, since the Serbian parallel courts in the
enclaves have stopped hearing criminal cases and the parallel courts within
Serbia hear (if any) only a few, there should be very few recent criminal cases
at issue and few (if any) new cases forthcoming. For minor crimes, statutes of
limitations may have run, precluding reconsideration of those cases.
Also, Kosovo's Criminal Procedure Code provides multiple mechanisms
for, if not officially recognizing Serbian parallel criminal judgments, at least
permitting them to stand without initiating new proceedings, on a case-bycase basis. Kosovo's provisional criminal code permits mediation of minor
crimes, and so in qualifying cases, the prosecutor could treat the Serbian
parallel court judgment as the equivalent of a mediation decision. The
Provisional Criminal Procedure Code provides guidelines for prosecutors to
consider in making such referrals and also requires the consent of both the
defendant and the victim. 2° 9 In cases meeting the guidelines, prosecutors could
employ either an opt-in or opt-out approach to consent, either proactively
contacting victims and defendants to request consent, or informing the public
at large of the need to opt out of minor Serbian parallel criminal judgments if
they wish the public prosecutor to pursue such cases and implying consent if
the parties do not opt out within a certain period of time.
In more serious cases with Serbian parallel guilty verdicts, prosecutors
could use the established principle of giving credit for time served for the
same act to make a principled decision not to prosecute someone who has
been convicted in a fair process in the Serbian parallel system and has already
209.

ProvisionalCriminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 228.
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210
served a sentence commensurate with that available under Kosovo law.
After all, in such cases, even if reprosecuted, the defendant should not be
subject to additional punishment under the provisions of Kosovo's provisional
criminal and criminal procedure codes. Similarly, rather than directly
recognizing just acquittals in the Serbian parallel system, prosecutors could
determine not to bring charges on the basis of the same lack of evidence that
led to the original, parallel acquittal. Any such determinations could be made
by recourse to the ordinary procedures of the Kosovo legal system.
While each of these mechanisms would require review of individual
cases within the prosecutors' offices, they would present a principled way of
mitigating the human cost to defendants of repeated prosecutions without
conceding the jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts or undermining the
fundamental demands of justice for victims and for the state. The real risk of a
case-by-case review is that this mechanism will likely not prove to be
comprehensive. Reviewing all the cases tried in the Serbian parallel system
would require the cooperation of the Serbian parallel courts themselves for
access to case files, and this is not likely to be forthcoming, at least in the
current political climate. Such review also represents a burden that the
UNMIK system may not be equipped to handle. Under these circumstances, it
would be wise for the prosecutor's office to begin with a review of those cases
that present potential violations of the public and victims' interest in justice
and other similarly serious failures of justice, using the international human
rights treaties and the domestic grounds for reopening final judgments as
guidelines for the circumstances that qualify as such.

V.

CONCLUSION

Under ordinary principles of conflict of laws and with the aims of
transitional justice in mind, the systematic recognition of most Serbian
parallel civil court judgments in Kosovo is both desirable and legally feasible.
In contrast, there are crucial differences between the Serbian parallel civil and
criminal judgments that weigh against sweeping recognition of the decisions
in criminal cases. In Kosovo's post-conflict context, the criminal judgments
implicate core questions of inter-ethnic justice, and recognizing them
wholesale would run the risk of legitimizing the very sort of inter-ethnic
discrimination and violence that is at the heart of the conflict: In contrast, the
injustices wrought by the Serbian parallel civil judgments seem to be
primarily the consequences of the very existence of dual, hostile systemsconflicting judgments and legal uncertainty-and therefore can be resolved
through systematic recognition of those judgments.
Furthermore, while the available legal models in the civil system enable
the recognition of Serbian parallel judgments without simultaneously
recognizing sovereignty or jurisdiction, those in the criminal system do not.
Rather, recognition of foreign criminal judgments depends expressly on state
authority for the legitimacy of the original judgment. Accordingly, any
decision to recognize Serbian parallel criminal judgments through this model
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would have to follow a political decision concerning sovereignty and
jurisdiction, rather than rendering such a decision unnecessary.
In addition, while the relevant civil judgment models have converged on
determinative factors for recognition that are useful and appropriate for
assessing Serbian parallel court judgments, this is not true for criminal cases.
Many of the determinative factors for mutual recognition of criminal
judgments are not bright-line rules that can be applied after the fact. Rather,
many come in the form of unwritten prerequisites for an agreement to
recognize and enforce criminal judgments, such as reciprocity, comity, and
confidence in the essential justice of the other system, all qualities that are
absent here.
Finally, a general international consensus has developed in favor of
validating the desire of the parties to choose foreign courts, arbitration
tribunals, and out-of-court settlements to resolve their civil disputes. This
consensus provides some normative imperative for recognizing the civil
judgments of alternative tribunals so long as the parties have participated
willingly in the process. There is, however, no such consensus in the world of
criminal law. Agreements to recognize foreign criminal judgments for
purposes of enforcement, or to bar future prosecutions, are few and far
between; momentum to create such agreements exists only between states that
have established common minimum standards for procedural protections and
have an interest in eventually achieving a unified legal system. Accordingly,
there is no similar normative consensus concerning the value or
appropriateness of recognizing foreign criminal decisions, particularly in
settings where procedural or substantive protections are in doubt.
One might question whether such a divided approach is workable in
practice, particularly should joint criminal-civil cases come before the courts.
However, as described above, civil and criminal judgments are subject to
different standards for recognition and enforcement under most legal systems.
In this sense, Kosovo's dual modes of analysis would not be peculiar, but
rather would be in accord with the practices of the other jurisdictions with
which Kosovo interacts, in particular the European Union and the United
States. Furthermore, most civil and criminal claims for recognition and
enforcement of judgments will come before the courts in very different
contexts: from a party seeking enforcement or non-enforcement in the civil
context, and from a prosecutor filing new charges against a defendant
previously tried in the criminal context. In those few instances in which the
two overlap, for example if a plaintiff sought to enforce a civil judgment
granted on the basis of a criminal conviction, the exceptions to the civil
judgments default rule of recognition would provide a sufficient basis for
examining the merits of the claim.
Looking beyond Kosovo, situations of legal pluralism with ambiguous
patterns of judgment recognition and enforcement are common to other states
with sharp ethnic and religious divisions, whether in post-conflict settings or
in more ordinary times. What principles or determinative factors do Kosovo's
situation and the legal models reviewed here suggest for other states with
multiple, conflicting court systems? This is a subject that deserves exploring
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in its own right, particularly when presented, as it is here, as a question of
transitional justice for a post-conflict state. I can offer here some preliminary
thoughts as to the issues that should be taken into account in determining
whether and how to recognize the judgments of alternative systems.
(i)

Political,Economic and Social Concerns

What are the political, economic and social incentives for recognition or
non-recognition, such as implications for sovereignty, non-recognition of
judgments as a barrier to efficient economic markets and social interchange,
or the existence of overlapping claims to property? In the examples
considered above, states have adopted models favoring broad and swift
recognition of judgments when they have important economic and social ties
to other states that will benefit from mutual recognition between the systems.
In contrast, if there is little economic or social interaction, or if there are
fundamental political issues such as sovereignty at stake, the political
drawbacks to automatic recognition of judgments may outweigh any social or
economic benefits.
In the same vein, can the relevant political questions be separated from
the legal questions? While in Kosovo the political issue of sovereignty could
be bypassed in civil cases but not in criminal cases, in other states sovereignty
may be a less acute issue. This would be the case, for example, if the
alternative court is part of an indigenous group with some degree of
recognized sovereignty. Alternatively, in formally divided states like Cyprus
or in states where the alternative institution operates only in discrete areas
such as the Zapatista courts in Mexico, distinctions in recognition based on
territorial jurisdiction may allow states to elide the problem of sovereignty.
(This distinction is in fact suggested by Kosovo's criminal procedure code,
although211it is not applicable to the territorially diffuse Serbian parallel
courts).
Finally, is there sufficient trust between the systems to serve as a basis
for reciprocity and comity? Are there ways of reliably transferring information
between the systems that could facilitate such practices? No matter how
appropriate the adopted rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments
may be, they will be effective only if applied in good faith and with a
reasonable degree of good will.
(ii)

Correspondenceto Existing Legal Models

Do the existing legal models provide determinative factors for decisionmaking that address the particular issues raised by the alternative system?
Here, in the civil cases, there was a well elaborated set of grounds for nonrecognition that is relevant to the crucial issues at stake in Kosovo. In the
criminal cases, in contrast, most models relied on pre-existing protections for
defendants' rights and so did not provide particular factors addressing the core
concern of sham or discriminatory proceedings.
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What are the principles upon which the legal legitimacy of the relevant
judgments is based? In the examples considered above, judgments based on
the consent of the parties are more susceptible to rules favoring recognition
than judgments based on sovereignty, because states treat the parties' consent
as mitigating some of the fairness concerns that might otherwise compel
greater scrutiny of the relevant judgment or proceedings. If consent is
relevant, is there a reliable way of systematically confirming the parties'
consent to participate in the alternative system? If the parties' consent can be
presumed in most cases, this may provide a basis for a default rule in favor of
recognition.
(iii) Areas of Convergence and Divergence
To what extent do the legal systems at issue converge or diverge? In
Kosovo, there is quite a bit of convergence in the procedures and rules of the
two systems due to their shared history.
Also, are there identifiable subcategories of cases that raise problems
that are different or more complex than other subcategories, such as the
property cases in Kosovo? Can these subcategories be readily divided from
the others and treated as a discrete category? In Kosovo's case, isolating the
contentious category of property cases should permit other civil matters to be
addressed more easily.
(iv) Fairnessv. Certainty
What are the fundamental fairness concerns at stake in this situation? If
there are systemic injustices that are internal to the alternative system and that
exist independently of any interaction with other systems, this tends to militate
toward non-recognition--or at least toward careful scrutiny-of an alternative
system's decisions, depending on the severity of the problems, how pervasive
they are, and whether they are confined to a subcategory of cases. Automatic
recognition of essentially unfair decisions would only exacerbate the problem
presented by the existence of the alternative system by increasing the scope of
its decisions' influence. On the other hand, an alternative system could be
essentially fair and internally consistent, but injustices may be created by
conflicts between the systems-for example, by conflicting judgments on the
same matter. If so, this tends to argue for general recognition of the alternative
system's cases, or at least certain subcategories of those cases, as such
recognition will itself help to prevent injustices from arising.
Finally, do the relevant fairness concerns exacerbate existing social
problems, especially those that gave rise to the division in the court systems in
the first place, such as inter-ethnic conflict or discrimination? If so, this tends
to increase the significance of the fairness concerns vis-d-vis other values such
as promoting economic efficiency. These interactions between the legal and
social issues should also be taken into account in considering the mechanism
used to address the decisions-for example, by identifying sub-categories of
alternative cases involving inter-ethnic issues that should receive special
treatment.
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Designing the Framework

The legal models discussed above also suggest mechanisms for
calibrating a recognition framework to take account of particular
circumstances and concerns. For example, in the civil context, where the
models share a fairly uniform default rule favoring recognition, there are
nonetheless substantial differences in the rule as applied. In practice, states
must decide whether to have an automatic or case-by-case recognition
process; the grounds for non-enforcement; whether to focus on the parties'
agreement to use the alternative system or on the fairness of the proceedings
themselves; and the level of judicial discretion. By making calculated choices
on these crucial factors, states can subject judgments to greater or lesser
scrutiny and establish corresponding levels of certainty and predictability.
Kosovo's Provisional Criminal Procedure Code suggests another alternative
approach, readily recognizing and enforcing judgments in which the state has
a lesser interest, while subjecting those in which the state's interest is high to
greater scrutiny.
These issues, of course, are not the only ones at stake, either in Kosovo
or in other transitioning and divided states. Nor can legal models be expected
to trump all political concerns. Ultimately, the future of Kosovo's parallel
court systems will depend, like the fate of Kosovo itself, on the ongoing
negotiations over Kosovo's political status. But whether and how to recognize
its past judgments is a legal question that can best be resolved by recourse to
the available legal models, leaving the larger political question of sovereignty
to the politicians.

